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SELF-DEFENSE, THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT AND PORT SECURITY
George K Walker*
Symposium colleagues have analyzed the law of the sea (LOS)
and U.S. law as they relate to ports security.' This article surveys other
situations, i.e., the intersection of port security issues with law of selfdefense and actions under the U.N. Charter, and the law of armed
conflict (LOAC) as it affects the oceans, historically styled the law of
naval warfare and neutrality. Jus cogens principles, i.e., fundamental
norms transcending the usual sources of international law, may apply in
these situations. Sometimes the results are the same as those under the
law of the sea or U.S. law; in others they are, or can be, radically
different.
Part I analyzes the law of self-defense and U.N. Charter law that
may affect ports and ports security. Part II briefly discussesjus cogens,
a relatively new concept of superior norms trumping traditional sources
of international law. Part III surveys armed conflict situations that may
affect port security issues and the conduct of military operations. Part
IV discusses the legitimacy under international law of certain state
actions relating to ports.
Professor of law, Wake Forest University School of Law. B.A.,
University of Alabama, 1959; LL.B., Vanderbilt University, 1966; A.M., Duke
University, 1968; LL.M., University of Virginia, 1972. Member, Virginia and
North Carolina bars. Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law,
1992-93, Naval War College. I presented an earlier version of this article
during a panel discussion in Symposium, The Ins and Outs of the Modem Port:
Where Do We Go from Here?, at the University of South Carolina School of
Law, on February 27, 2009. I am grateful for comments and suggestions that
my co-panelists, Jennifer L. North and John T. Oliver, gave, and for the Journal
staff's comments and assistance in preparing this for publication. A Wake
Forest University School of Law grant supported research. Errors are my
responsibility. Copyright (c) George K. Walker.
1 Jennifer L. North, The Ins and Outs of Modern Ports: Rethinking
ContainerSecurity, 5 S.C. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 193 (2009); John T. Oliver, Legal
and Policy FactorsGoverning the Imposition of Conditions on Access to and
JurisdictionOver Foreign-FlaggedVessels in U.S. Ports, 5 id. 213 (2009). See

also William D. Baumgartner & John T. Oliver, Conditions on Entry of
Foreign-Flag Vessels into US Ports to Promote Maritime Security,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONs, 84 INT'L L. STUD. SER. 33

(Michael L. Karsten ed., 2008).
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I. SELF-DEFENSE AND U.N. CHARTER LAW
Besides principles emanating from the law of self-defense, today
intertwined with law under the U.N. Charter, there are special situations
involving self-defense in the territorial sea, internal waters and ports of
States. 2 Part L.A analyzes self-defense and Charter law; Part I.B
discusses circumstances where self-defense may be involved with
territorial sea, internal waters or port security situations.
A. THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE; UN. CHARTER LAW

Like the U.S. Constitution's Supremacy Clause,3 the Charter also
has a "trumping" provision, Article 103, declaring that the Charter is
supreme over all treaties. There are several issues with respect to it.
Does Article 103 also override other primary sources of international
2 A State's territorial sea, although subject to innocent passage rules,
see infra notes 73, 75, 88, 136-38 and accompanying text, is part of the coastal
State's sovereign territory. Internal waters lie to the landward side of baselines
defining the territorial sea and are also part of the coastal State's sovereign
territory. Airspace above the territorial sea and internal waters is also subject to
coastal State sovereignty. U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, arts. 2, 4, 5, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter UNCLOS); Convention on the
Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone, arts. 1-2, 5(1), 6, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T.
1606, 516 U.N.T.S. 205 (hereinafter Territorial Sea Convention); Convention
on International Civil Aviation, arts. 1, 2, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, 15
U.N.T.S. 295. Most ports lie in internal waters and are therefore subject to that
coastal State's sovereign control. A.R. Thomas & James C. Duncan, eds.,
Annotated Supplement to the Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations,73 INT'L L. STUD. SER. 1, 115 at 2.3.1 (1999).
3 U.S. Const. art. VI.
4 U.N. Charter art. 103; see also International Law Commission, Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, (hereinafter ILC Draft Articles on State
Responsibility), art. 59 & cmt., in Report on the Work of Its Fifty-Third
Session (23 April - 1 June and 2 July - 10 August 2001), U.N. GAOR, 55th
Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10, at 365 (hereinafter 2001 ILC Rep.),
reprinted in JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S
ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 314 (2002); LELAND F. GOODRICH ET AL.,
CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 614-17 (3d & rev. ed. 1969); ROBERT
JENNINGS & ARTHUR WATTS, OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW § 592 (9TH ED.
1996); 2 BRUNO B. SIMMA, ED., THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS 1292-

1302 (20 ED. 2002); Robin R. Churchill, Conflicts between United Nations
Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law ofthe Sea, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND MILITARY OPERATIONS, supra note

1, at 143, 148.
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law, 5 e.g. Articles 2(4) and 51, and not custom and general principles of
law? If all of the Charter recites fundamental norms orjus cogens, as
some Soviet authors claimed, 6 Article 103 would supersede customary
or general principles rules. A more modest claim would be that only
selected Charter provisions, e.g., and not Article 103, have jus cogens
status.
Even if Article 103 does not representjus cogens (and this is my
view), what is its status if coupled with action pursuant to other Charter
provisions? The first is the "inherent right of individual and collective
self-defense," which States may invoke until the U.N. Security Council
acts on a particular situation pursuant to Charter Article 51. 7 When
5 I.C.J. Statute arts. 38(1) and 59 recite the traditional primary sources

of international law, treaties, custom, and general principles, and two
subordinate sources, scholars' research and judicial decisions and that there is
no concept of common-law precedent in international law. See also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD), FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§

102-03 (1987) (hereinafter RESTATEMENT); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 1, cmt. c (1965); IAN
BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW CH. 1 (7TH ED. 2008);
R.R. CHURCHILL & A.V. LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 5-13 (3d ed. 1999) (LOS
source analysis); Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, §§ 8-17.
6

GRIGORII 1. TUNKIN, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (William E.

Butler trans. 1974); see infra Part II forjus cogens analysis.
7 U.N. Charter art. 51; see also Goodrich et al., supra note 4, at 34253; 1 SIMMA, supra note 4, at 778-806. U.N. Charter art. 2(1) recognizes the
principle of state sovereignty, traditionally interpreted to mean that in the
absence of governing law, States may act in their interest. U.N. Charter art.
2(1). National sovereignty, sometimes diminished or eroded, has been a
fundamental principle since the Peace of Westphalia, Treaty of Peace of
Munster, Fr.-Holy Rom. Empire, Oct. 14/24, 1648, art. 64, 1 Consol. T.S. 198,
319; Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Swed.-Holy Rom. Empire, Oct. 14/24,
1648, art. 9 id. 119, 198; see also Christian L. Wiktor, Multilateral Treaty
Calendar 1648-1995, at 3 (1998). The Peace of Westphalia began the modem
State system. Leo Gross, The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948, 42 AM. J. INT'L
L. 20 (1948). Treaties and decisions invoking the sovereignty principle include
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 157(3); Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, May 23, 1969, pmbl., 1155 id. 331 (hereinafter Vienna Convention);
S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 10, at 4, 18; S.S.
Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 id., No. 1, at 15, 25; see also Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations & Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, Principle
6, G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1970) (hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration), reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 1292;
Declaration on Inadmissibility of Intervention in Domestic Affairs of States &
Protection of Their Independence & Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR,
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Article 51 is coupled with Article 103, as a matter of the law of treaties,
does this mean that an Article 51-supported right of self-defense
supersedes treaties like the LOS conventions?

It would seem so. The

20th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/2131 (1965), reprintedin Dietrich Rauschning et
al., Key Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 1946-1996, at 26,
28 (1997); United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility:
Report of the Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and
Change
29 (2004) (states accepting U.N. Charter benefit of "privileges of
sovereignty . . . [must] also accept its responsibilities") (hereinafter High-Level
Panel); U.N. Secretary-General, An Agenda for Peace: Report of the
Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization, U.N. Doc. A/49/277,
S/24111 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 956, 959; MICHAEL AKEHURST, A
MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 21-23 (Brian Chapman ed.,
3d ed. 1977); J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 45-49 (Humphrey Waldock
ed., 6th ed. 1963); Brownlie, supra note 5, at 289-91; Goodrich et al., supra at
36-40; Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, §§ 37, 107; LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW
OF TREATIES 754-66 (1961); RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, Part I, ch. I,
Introductory Note, 16 & 17; 1 SIMMA, supra note 4, at 70-91; R.P. Anand,
Sovereign Equality of States in International Law, 197 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 22-51
(1986); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Empowering the United Nations, FOREIGN AFF.
89, 98-99 (Winter 1992); Jonathan I. Charney, Universal InternationalLaw, 87
AM. J. INT'L L. 529, 539 (1993); Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principlesof
International Law Considered from the Standpoint of the Rule of Law, 92
R.C.A.D.1. 1, 49-50 (1957); Louis Henkin, InternationalLaw: Politics, Values
and Functions, 216 id. 9, 46, 130 (1989); Oscar Schachter, InternationalLaw
in Theory and Practice, 178 id. 9, 32 (1982); C.H.M. Waldock, General
Course on Public InternationalLaw, 106 id. 1, 156-72 (1962). Sovereignty is a
debatable issue today. Henry Kissinger, Does America Need a Foreign Policy?
21-22, 235-37 (2001) declared that the concept of sovereignty was in trouble;
Henkin, International, supra had recognized the force of sovereignty, but
Louis HENKIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW: POLITICS AND VALUES 8-10 (1995)
denounced the concept.
8 Today the United States and a dwindling number of States are party
to four treaties that are a primary source, other than custom, for LOS situations:
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2; Convention on the Continental Shelf,
Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 478, 499 U.N.T.S. 311 (hereinafter Continental Shelf
Convention); Convention on Fishing & Conservation of the Living Resources
of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, 559 U.N.T.S. 285 (hereinafter
Fishing Convention); Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82 (hereinafter High Seas Convention). UNCLOS, supra
note 2, and its 1994 protocol, Agreement Relating to the Implementation of
Part 11 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982, July 28, 1994, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3, 42 (hereinafter 1994
Agreement) are not treaty law for the United States, although they have been
reported out of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee favorably with
many declarations and statements twice. See generally George K. Walker,
Filling Some of the Gaps: The International Law Association (American
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1958 conventions govern discrete sea areas and part of the sea bottom
(territorial sea, contiguous zone, continental shelf, high seas) and
fishing but do not cover important issues such as the breadth of the
territorial sea or claims regarding the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).
By contrast, the 1982 Convention has been hailed as a "constitution for
the oceans" purporting to cover all sea areas, usages of ocean areas, and
the sea bottom. 9 What about treaties governing the humanitarian law,

the law of naval warfare and maritime neutrality,' ° including the
Branch) Law of the Sea Definitions Project, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1336, 1345
(2009). UNCLOS and the 1994 Agreement, supra remain in the Foreign
Relations Committee and may be reported out, undoubtedly with many
declarations and statements, in the new Congress. The United States has
declared that UNCLOS' navigational articles represent U.S. customary
practice. President Ronald Reagan, United States Oceans Policy, 19 Weekly
Comp. Pres. Doc. 383 (No. 10, 1983). There are 158 States parties to
UNCLOS, supra note 2; 136 to the 1994 Agreement, supra; 52 to the
Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2; 58 to the Continental Shelf
Convention, supra; 38 to the Fishing Convention, supra; and 63 to the High
Seas Convention, supra. United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Treaty
Section, United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral Treaties Deposited with
the Secretary General, available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Participation
Status.aspx (visited June 12, 2009) (hereinafter Multilateral Treaties). Because
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 31 1(l) declares that id. prevails among parties to
UNCLOS instead of the 1958 Conventions, the legal effect of the latter treaties
is much less than the numbers would suggest. They are only effective between
States, like the United States, that are not UNCLOS parties.
9 Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2; Continental Shelf
Convention, Fishing Convention and High Seas Convention, supra note 8;
UNCLOS, supra note 2; 1994 Agreement, supra note 8; Tommy T.B. Koh,
Statement: A Constitutionforthe Oceans, 1 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea 1982: A Commentary I I (Myron H. Nordquist ed.-in-chief,
1985) (hereinafter I Commentary).
10 Among the most important today is Convention (II) for the
Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of
Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
(hereinafter Second Convention), replacing Convention for the Adaptation to
Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention (Hague X), Oct.
18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2371, in force as the humanitarian law standard during
World Wars I and I1. Other early treaties include Declaration Respecting
Maritime Law, Apr. 16, 1856, 115 Consol. T.S. 1; Convention Relating to
Status of Enemy Merchant Ships at the Outbreak of Hostilities (Hague VI),
Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 305, never in force for the United States
(hereinafter Hague VI); Convention Relating to Conversion of Merchant Ships
into War-Ships (Hague VII), Oct. 18, 1907, 205 Consol. T.S. 319, also never
in force for the United States (hereinafter Hague VII); Convention Relative to
Laying of Automatic Submarine Contact Mines (Hague VIII), Oct. 18, 1907,
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territorial sea involved with ports, in a self-defense situation? And if
self-defense represents a customary norm, following the Nicaragua
Case theory that a customary rule can develop alongside a Charter
norm when the Charter does not apply,"' might this tip the scales
against applying LOAC treaties? 12 On the other hand, the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which the United States is not a
party, declares that a treaty breach does not suspend or end a treaty
governing humanitarian law. 13
Does this Vienna Convention
36 Stat. 2332 (hereinafter Hague VIII); Convention Concerning Bombardment
by Naval Forces in Time of War (Hague IX), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2351
(hereinafter Hague IX); Convention Relative to Certain Restrictions on the
Exercise of the Right of Capture in Maritime War (Hague XI), Oct. 18, 1907,
36 Stat. 2396 (hereinafter Hague XI); Convention Conceming the Rights and
Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat.
2415 (hereinafter Hague XIII); Convention on Maritime Neutrality, Feb. 20,
1928, 47 Stat. 1989, 135 L.N.T.S. 188; Proces-Verbal Relating to Rules of
Submarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the Treaty of London of 22 April
1930, Nov. 6, 1936, 3 Bevans 298, 173 L.N.T.S. 353, analyzed infra Part III.
" Military & Paramilitary Activities in & Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 94 (customary norm paralleling U.N. Charter art. 2[4])
(hereinafter Nicaragua Case).
12 An example of this is the general rule against capture of coastal
fishing vessels, governed by Hague Xl, supra note 10, art. 3; in a self-defense
situation, e.g., if one of these otherwise protected vessels, registered under a
belligerent's flag, fires on an investigating warship, a warship's boat or a
helicopter attached to a warship, the warship, boat or helicopter could exercise
lawful self-defense instead of trying to board the vessel to determine its
eligibility for protected status under Hague XI, supra. The same would be true
for a fishing vessel of neutral registry during armed conflict or a fishing vessel
in lawful passage in the territorial sea, perhaps adjacent to a port, that is subject
to the law of the sea. In either case the warship, its boat or its helicopter may
respond in self-defense. In all of these cases the right of self-defense is subject
to the limitations of necessity, proportionality, and in anticipatory self-defense
situations, circumstances permitting of no other alternative. See infra notes 14,
213-214 and accompanying text.
13 Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 60(5). There is a current
debate on whether Article 60(5) covers human rights conventions as well as
treaties regulating humanitarian law.
See generally ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4,
art. 50 & 1 8, in 2001 ILC Rep., supra note 4, at 333, 336, reprinted in
Crawford, supra note 4, at 288, 290; Anthony Aust, MODERN TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 238 (2d ed. 2007); (although negotiators had the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, which include Second Convention, supra note 10, in mind, art.
60[5] "would apply equally to other conventions of a humanitarian character, or
to human rights treaties, since they create rights intended to protect individuals
irrespective of the conduct of the parties to each other"); Brownlie, supra note
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limitation on breaches of a treaty apply in self-defense situations, given
Articles 51 and 103, or if there is a parallel customary law of selfdefense? 14 The law of treaties gives no clear answer. 5 Individual
States may invoke the right of self-defense, but the Charter also
recognizes the "inherent right of ...collective self-defense .... 6 and

collective self-defense can be asserted through multilateral defense
treaties such as the North Atlantic Treaty (i.e., NATO) 17 or bilateral

5, at 622-23; Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, § 649, at 1302; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 5, § 335, cmt. c; Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties 190 (2d ed. 1984); Louise Doswald-Beck & Sylvain Vite,
InternationalHumanitarianLaw and Human Rights Law, 1993 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 94; Crawford, Introduction, in Crawford, supra, at 41 (State cannot
disregard human rights obligations because of another State's breach; no
Vienna Convention, supra citation for the point); David Weissbrodt & Peggy
L. Hicks, Implementation of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law in
Situations of Armed Conflict, 1993 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 120. Aust, supra
seems to be the only commentator applying Article 60(5) to human rights
treaties; see also Crawford, supra. Preparatory works discussing other sources,
supra and Article 60(5)'s text ("treaties of a humanitarian character"), as
distinguished from "treaties of a human rights character," suggests a misstating
of the law if distinctions between humanitarian and human rights law remain.
14 This article does not enter debates over the lawfulness of
anticipatory self-defense, or the U.S. "preemption doctrine." See generally
Baumgartner & Oliver, supra note 1, at 53; Walker, supra note 8, at 1355, and
sources cited. The U.S. view is that the right of self-defense includes not only a
right to react, subject to principles of necessity and proportionality, in selfdefense ("reactive" self-defense to hostile attack), but also a right of
anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a response in anticipation of a hostile attack (i.e.,
a response to hostile intent) that is necessary and proportional, when the need to
respond is instant, overwhelming and admitting of no other alternative. Thomas
& Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2.1.
15 George K. Walker, The 2006 Conflict in Lebanon, or What Are the
Armed Conflict Rules When Legal Principles Collide?, ch. 15, in ENEMY
COMBATANTS, TERRORISM, AND ARMED CONFLICT LAW: A GUIDE TO THE ISSUES
(David K. Linnan ed., 2008), proposes a factorial analysis for this kind of
situation.
16 U.N. Charter art. 5 1.
17 North Atlantic Treaty, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 224, 34 U.N.T.S. 243,
to which there have been many protocols as other States have joined the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO). United States Department of
State, Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other International Agreements
of the United States of America on January 1, 2008, at 413-14 (2008)
(hereinafter TIF). The Treaty, supra, was invoked during Operation Enduring
Freedom, which began the United States' campaign in Afghanistan in 2001
after the 9/11 attacks. George K. Walker, The Lawfulness of Operation
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agreements.1 8 Multilateral self-defense also can be invoked in coalition
operations, i.e., if no formal treaty supports action.19 Multilateral
action of States raises other issues, e.g., where States have different
views on the scope of self-defense, i.e., countries involved in
multilateral action taking a position that they may respond in
anticipatory self-defense or only in reaction to attack, or differences on
what is necessary or proportional in a self-defense response. 20 This
kind of situation might arise in Indian Ocean operations off Somalia,
where some warships are part of a NATO force established after 9/11,
and others are there as coalition partners, if they, their small boats or
their helicopters, are attacked. 2 1

EnduringFreedom's Self-Defense Responses, 37 VALPARAISO L. REv. 489, 499
(2003).

18

The United States may have negotiated bilateral agreements with

some participating States at the start of the campaign 1990-1991 campaign
against Iraq; these have never been published.
The Security Council
recognized the right of self-defense early in the crisis. S.C. Resolution 660,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/660 (1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1325 (1990); George K.
Walker, The Crisis Over Kuwait, August 1990 - February 1991, 1991 DUKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 25, 30. There is no international law obligation to publish
these agreements; many may not come to light for years, an example being
Articles of Agreement Governing Collaboration Between the Authorities of the
United States of America and the United Kingdom in the Matter of Tube
Alloys, U.K.-U.S., Aug. 19, 1943, 5 U.S.T. 1114, 214 U.N.T.S. 341, the World
War 11 U.K.-U.S. executive agreement to develop the nuclear weapon; see also
McNair, supra note 7, at 32-34. U.N. Charter art. 102 does not require
publication, although a treaty must be filed with the United Nations if invoked
before a U.N. agency; see also Goodrich et al., supra note 4, at 610-14; 2
SIMMA, supra note 4, at 1277-92. Otherwise, national security considerations
may keep it in classified files. RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 312 r.n. 5.
Mutual Defense Agreement, Japan-U.S., Mar. 8, 1954, 5 U.S.T. 661, 232
U.N.T.S. 169, is an example of a published bilateral self-defense treaty.
19 For the most part operations in Iraq since 1990 have been coalition
actions. Walker, supra note 18, at 40-45 (early operations). Operations in
Afghanistan have been a mix of actions pursuant to coalition agreements and
self defense treaties. Walker, supra note 17, at 532-34 (early operations).
20 See supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text; see also Thomas
M.
Franck, On Proportionalityof Countermeasuresin InternationalLaw, 102 AM
J. INT'L L. 715, 719-37 (2008) (noting the distinction between proportionality

in self-defense and LOAC situations, and four other situations).

21 The attacks might come on the high seas as well, but with U.N.
Security Council authority to enter Somalia's territorial sea to engage pirates,
there is a possibility of attacks in those waters, too. See infra notes 38-41, 5667, 111-19 and accompanying text.
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A decisionmaker faced with a self-defense situation should be
held to what he or she knows, or reasonably should know, of applicable
protections under humanitarian law or human rights law.22 (Hindsight
can be 20/20; the fog of war,23 i.e., armed conflict, may cloud a
decision on attacks during conflict. Similarly, the fog surrounding
actions taken in self-defense or pursuant to a Council decision may
cloud decisions for self-defense or for Council action when they are
taken.)
These knowledge standards, i.e., that decisionmakers are bound
by that they know or reasonably should know, are taken from LOAC
principles. Declarations of understanding 24 by countries party to
Protocol 125 to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 26 recite that for civilians'
protection in Protocol I, Article 51,27 civilian objects protection in
22

George K. Walker, The Tanker War 1980-1988: Law and Policy, 74

INT'L L. STUD. SER. 1, 160-61 (2000).
23

CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 117-21 (Michael Howard & Peter

Paret ed. & trans. 1976).
24 See generally George K. Walker, Professionals' Definitions and
States' Interpretative Declarations (Understandings, Statements or
Declarations)for the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 21 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 461 (2007) for analysis of understandings in the law of treaties.
25 Protocol Additional to Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, &
Relating to Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 (hereinafter Protocol I).
26 Convention (I) for Amelioration of Condition of the Wounded & Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31
(hereinafter First Convention); Second Convention, supra note 10; Convention
(III) Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 (hereinafter Third Convention); Convention (IV) Relative to
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516,
75 U.N.T.S. 287 (hereinafter Fourth Convention).
27 Protocol 1, supra note 25, art. 51. Arts. 51(2) and 51(5) prohibitions
on attacks on civilians, absent other considerations, e.g., civilians who take up
arms, restate customary law. Michael Bothe et al., New Rules for Victims of
Armed Conflict 299 & n.3 (1982); International Lawyers and Naval Experts
Convened by the International Institute of Humanitarian Law, San Remo
Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea
39
(Louise Doswald-Beck ed. 1995) (hereinafter San Remo Manual); Thomas &
Duncan, supra note 2,
6.2.3.2 (Fourth Convention, supra note 26, art. 33
protections), 11.2 n.3, 11.3; 4 Jean S. Pictet, Commentary 224-29 (1958); Yves
Sandoz et al., Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the
Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, at 618, 623-26 (1987); Julius Stone,
Legal Controls of International Conflict 684-732 (1959 rev.): U.S. Department
of the Air Force, International Law - The Conduct of Armed Conflict and Air
Operations: AFP 110-31 ch. 14 (1976) (hereinafter AFP 110-3 1); Michael J.
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Article 52,28 and precautions to be taken in attacks in Article 57, 29 a
commander should be liable based on that commander's assessment of
information available at the relevant time, i.e., when a decision to

Matheson, Remarks, in Session One: The United States' Position on the
Relation of Customary InternationalLaw to the 1977 Protocols Additional to
the Geneva Conventions, in Symposium, The Sixth Annual American Red Cross
- Washington College of Law Conference on International HumanitarianLaw:
A Workshop on Customary International Law and the 1977 Protocols
Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,lain 2 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL.
419, 423, 426 (1987); William G. Schmidt, The Protection of Victims of

International Armed Conflicts: Protocol I Additional to the Geneva
Conventions, 24 AIR FORCE L. REV. 189, 225-32 (1984); Waldemar A. Solf,

Protection of Civilians Against the Effects of Hostilities Under Customary
InternationalLaw and Under Protocol/, 1 AM U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 117, 130-31
(1986). Civilians may not be used as human shields, nor may they be a subject
of attacks intended to terrorize them, although otherwise legitimate attacks that
happen to terrorize them are permissible. Specific intent to terrorize civilians
gives rise to liability. Thomas & Duncan, supra, T 11.2 (Fourth Convention,
supra, arts. 28, 33 protections), 11.3; 4 Pictet, supra at 208-09, 224-29; HansPeter Gasser, Prohibition of Terrorist Attacks in International Humanitarian
Law, 1985 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 200; Commission of Jurists to Consider and
Report Upon Revision of Rules of Air Warfare, Rules for Aerial Warfare, art.
22 (hereinafter Hague Air Rules), reprinted in DIETRICH SCHINDLER & JIRI

TOMAN, THE LAWS OF ARMED CONFLICTS 315, 319 (4th rev. ed. 2004);
Matheson, Remarks, supra at 426; Schmidt, supra at 227.
28 Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 52. Article 52 states a general
customary norm, except its art. 52(1) prohibition on reprisals against civilians,
upon which commentators divide. See generally Bothe et al., supra note 27, at
320-27; C. JOHN COLOMBOs, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA §§ 510-11,
524-25, 528-29 (6th rev. ed. 1967); YORAM DrNsTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF
HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT ch. 4 (2004); Thomas &

Duncan, supra note 2,
6.2.3 & n.36, 6.2.3.2 (Fourth Convention, supra note
26, art. 33 protections for some civilians from reprisals), 8.1.1 & n.9, 8.1.2 &
n.12 (U.S. position that Protocol 1,supra, art. 52[l] "creates new law"); 2 D.P.
O'Connell, The International Law of the Sea 1105-06 (1984); 4 Pictet, supra
note 27, at 131; Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 630-38; Matheson, Remarks,
supra note 27, at 426; Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The Principle of the Military
Objective in the Law ofArmed Conflict, in THE LAW OF MILITARY OPERATIONS:
LIBER AMICORUM PROFESSOR JACK GRUNAWALT, 72 INT'L L. STUD. SER. 197

(Michael N. Schmitt ed., 1998); Solf, supra note 27, at 131. Frank Russo, Jr.,
Targeting Theory in the Law of Naval Warfare, 30 NAV. L. REv. 1, 17 n.36
(1992) rejects Protocol I, supra art. 52(2) for naval warfare.
29 Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 57; see also Bothe et al., supra note 27,
at 359-69; Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 678-89; Thomas & Duncan, supra

note 2, 77 8.1-8.1.2.1.
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attack is made.3 ° Two 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention 3'
protocols have similar terms, i.e., a standard for jus ad bellum, i.e., a
commander is bound by information available when a decision to
attack is made.32 The Cultural Property Convention Second Protocol
also recites the principle.33 Protocol I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions,
30

Declaration of Australia, June 24, 1991, reprinted in

SCHINDLER

&

TOMAN, supra note 27, at 793; Declaration of Belgium, May 20, 1986,
reprinted in id. 795, 796; Declaration of Canada, Nov. 22, 1990, reprinted in
id. 796, 797-98; Declaration of Germany, Feb. 15, 1991, reprinted in id. 802;
Declaration of Ireland, reprinted in id. 804, 805; Declaration of Italy, Feb. 27,
1986, reprinted in id. 807; Declaration of Netherlands, July 10, 1987,
reprinted in id 809, 810; Declaration of New Zealand, Feb. 12, 1988, reprinted
in id. 810; Declarations of Spain, Nov. 24, 1989, reprinted in id. 812, 813;
Declaration of United Kingdom, Dec. 12, 1977, reprinted in id. 814, 815.
31 Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Certain
Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or
to Have Indiscriminate Effects, Oct. 10, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. -,
1342 U.N.T.S.
137 (hereinafter Conventional Weapons Convention).
32 Id., Protocol 1I on Prohibitions or Restrictions on
Use of Mines,
Booby-Traps & Other Devices, Oct. 10, 1980, art. 2(4), 1342 U.N.T.S. 168,
amended May 3, 1996, art. 7(1)(1), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra
note 27, at 196, 200-01 (hereinafter Weapons Protocol II); Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on Use of Incendiary Weapons (Protocol III), Oct.
10, 1980, art. 1(3), 1342 U.N.T.S. 171 (hereinafter Weapons Protocol III). The
United States ratified the Convention, supra and Protocol on Non-Detectable
Fragments (Protocol 1), Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 168 (hereinafter
Weapons Protocol 1) and Protocol I1supra; Weapons Protocol III is not in force
for the United States. TIF, supra note 17, at 467-68. Amended Weapons
Protocol I1, Protocol III and Protocol IV on Blinding Laser Weapons, May 3,
1995, 35 I.L.M. 1218 [hereinafter Weapons Protocol IV] are before the U.S.
Senate. Marian Nash Leich, Contemporary Practice of the United States
Relating to International Law, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 325 (1997). Weapons
Protocols I and IV, supra do not have these provisions.
33 Second Protocol to Hague Convention of 1954 for Protection of
Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, art. I(f), Mar. 26, 1999, 38
I.L.M. 769 (hereinafter Second Protocol), referring to Convention for
Protection of Cultural Property in Event of Armed Conflict, & Regulations,
May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 (hereinafter Cultural Property Convention);
see also Protocol, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 358 (hereinafter First Protocol).
Second Protocol, supra is in force for 52 States; 123 countries, but not the
United States, which is a signatory, have ratified the Cultural Property
Convention, supra; 100 have ratified its First Protocol, supra. International
Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent (hereinafter ICRC), State Parties
to the Following International Humanitarian Law and Other Related Treaties as
of 29-Jan-2009, Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Additional
Protocols of 8 June 1977: Ratifications, Accessions and Successions (Dec. 3,
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with its understandings, and the Conventional Weapons Convention
Protocols are on their way to general acceptance among States.34 These
treaties' common statement, in text or declarations, that commanders
are accountable based on information they have at the time for
determining whether attacks are necessary and proportional has become
a nearly universal norm. The San Remo Manual recognizes it as the
naval warfare standard.35 It can be said with fair confidence that this is
the jus in bello customary standard. It should be the standard for selfdefense. A national leader or military commander directing a selfdefense response, or a response pursuant to a Council decision, whether
reactive or anticipatory, should be held to the same standard as a
commander in the field deciding on attacks, i.e., being held accountable
for what he or she, or those reporting to the leader, knew or reasonably
should have known, when a decision is made to respond in self-defense
or acting pursuant to a Security Council decision. As in the difference
between necessity and proportionality standards for LOAC and selfdefense situations, what is sufficient knowledge depends on each
circumstance. What might be sufficient knowledge in an LOAC
situation might not be sufficient knowledge in a self-defense situation,
and vice versa.
Although multilateral self-defense is thought of in terms of open
ocean operations, it could involve territorial sea situations, including
waters close to ports. Recall offers of assistance by neighboring States,
e.g., Mexico, after Hurricane Katrina and similar offers of assistance to
Myanmar (Burma) after a hurricane hit. If accepted, and hypothetically
there were attacks on these forces, this might have involved responses
in U.S. or Myanmar territorial waters and perhaps during operations
ashore. The same problem arose after the tsunami in Indonesia, which
was reluctant to accept U.S. naval task force and perhaps others'
assistance except under limitations. A latent problem in the case of
2001), available at http://www.icrc.org[IHL.nsf/(SPF)/partymain-treaties/
$File/IHL and otherrelatedTreaties.pdf (visited Feb. 4, 2008) (hereinafter
ICRC).
34 Nearly all countries but not the United States are Protocol I, supra
note 25, parties; ICRC, supra note 33, lists 168 States; 109 countries including
the United States for Conventional Weapons Convention, supra note 31; 92 for
Weapons Protocol II, supra note 32, including the United States; 92 for

Amended Weapons Protocol II, supra note 32; 102 for Weapons Protocol III,
supra note 32; 52 for Second Protocol, supra note 33.

35 San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 46(b) & cmt. 46.3; see also Ben
Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and
Tribunals 90 (1983); Myres S. McDougal & Florentino Feliciano, Law and
Minimum World Public Order 220 (1961).

2009]

SELF-DEFENSE, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
AND PORT SECURITY

359

Indonesia, a former Netherlands colony, may have been concern over
territorial integrity and political independence.36 This sort of issue may
arise in other circumstances.
A final question is self-defense against non-state actors, e.g.,
terrorists or pirates. Does Charter law govern these actions today, or
are they subject to other, perhaps analogous, principles? 37 Today a
multinational naval force steams off Somalia's coast, attempting to
deter piracy. The Security Council, with Somalia's consent, has given
States limited authority to act in Somali territorial waters against pirates
preying on merchant shipping off the Horn of Africa.38 What standards
would govern if a pirate ship, perhaps very foolishly or by mistake,
attacks a warship 39 or a warship's small boats or patrol aircraft?
36 U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also Goodrich, supra note 4, at 43-55;

Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, § 268, at 704; 1 SIMMA, supra note 4, at 11236.
37 Kenneth O'Rourke, Commentary Maritime & Coalition
Operations, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM, 79 INT'L L.

STUD. SER. 297, 298 (Fred L. Borch & Paul S. Wilson, eds., 2003) (U.N.
Charter art. 51 source for responding to terrorists at sea in MIO, maritime
interception operations); Wolff von Heinegg, The Legality of Maritime
Interception/Interdiction Operations Within the Framework of Operation
Enduring Freedom, in id. 255, 264; see generally Baumgartner & Oliver, supra
note i, at 51-61 on anti-terrorist and anti-criminal measures the United States
has taken with respect to ports and port security.
38 S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (2008), calling for action
against pirates, and authorizing action for 12 months after the date of S.C. Res.
1846, U.N. Doc. S/RES/I 846 (Dec. 2, 2008), which had commended States and
organizations working to suppress piracy, had called upon them to act to
suppress the crime, and had decided to authorize action within Somalia's
territorial sea, a mandatory command to participating States. Earlier the U.N.
Security Council and the International Maritime Organization, a U.N.
specialized agency dealing with shipping safety and related matters, had
expressed its concern over the situation. See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/1816 (2008); Jane G. Dalton et al., Introductory Note to United Nations
Security Council Resolutions 1816, 1846 & 1851 - Piracy and Armed Robbery
at Sea, 48 I.L.M. 129 (2009); see also infra notes 56-67, 111-19 and
accompanying text.
39 UNCLOS,

supra note 2,

art.

29, "for the purposes of this

Convention," defines "warship" as "a ship belonging to the armed forces of a
State bearing the external marks distinguishing such ships of its nationality,
under the command of an officer duly commissioned by the government of the
State and whose name appears in the appropriate service list or its equivalent,
and manned by a crew which is under regular armed forces discipline;" High
Seas Convention, supra note 8, art. 8(2) has a similar definition but applies
only to high seas areas, a subtle difference (and deficiency) between the 1958
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Council Resolutions on Somalia do not answer this question; the
warship, its boats or patrol aircraft would have a right of unit selfdefense. 40 Another troubling issue is whether States, with Council
authority to suppress pirates in the Somali territorial sea, could
unilaterally chase them ashore and destroy their dens there without
Council authorization. 4' Does Charter law cover those situations, since
the authority to be in the territorial sea stemmed from Council
resolutions, or are there other rules?
There are three more situations where Charter law may raise
issues. If the Council "decides" on action through its authority in the
Charter, maybe after receiving an Article 51 report but maybe through
another state's report,42 U.N. Members must comply with the
decision.43 Second, if there is a Council resolution "calling" for or
recommending action under Chapter VII of the Charter, 4 or if a
General Assembly resolution recommends action if a matter is not
before the Council, under the majority view these do not mandate
conventions and UNCLOS, supra. U.S. Navy and Coast Guard vessels are
considered warships. Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, t 2.1.1. Hague VII,
supra note 10, arts. 2-3 define warships in similar terms for LOAC situations.
See also San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 13(g); infra notes 68, 203 and
accompanying text.
40 U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 3-35 and
accompanying text.
41 S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 38, 6 declares that cooperating States
may do so, but only with advance notice by the Somalia government to the
U.N. Secretary-General, pursuant to the government's request. The narrow
issue I pose is whether States may take unilateral action in the Somalia
question. My answer is, likely not, since the Resolution covers the point. But
what about other piracy situations?
42 A U.N. Member may also bring a dispute likely to endanger
international peace and security to the General Assembly's attention. A nonMember State may raise these issues if it accepts U.N. Charter art. 33's pacific
dispute settlement methods. Id. arts. 35, 51; see also Goodrich et al., supra
note 4, at 270-77; 1 SIMMA, supranote 4, at 608-15, 804-05.
43 U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48, 94(2), 103; see also Goodrich, supra note
4, at 207-11, 334-37, 555-59, 614-17; 1 & 2 SIMMA, supra note 4, at 454-62,
776-80, 1174-79, 1292-1302; San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 99 7-9;
Churchill, supra note 4, at 148-49; W. Michael Reisman, The Constitutional
Crisis in the United Nations, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 83, 87 (1993) (principles
flowing from Council decisions pursuant to Articles 25, 48, 103 are treaty law
binding U.N. Members and override other treaty obligations); supra notes 3-6
and accompanying text.
44 U.N. Charter arts. 39-51, provisions for situations involving breaches
of the peace or threats to international peace and security and the inherent right
of individual and collective self-defense.
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Members' action.45
Under the Assembly's Uniting for Peace
Resolution, however, by which the United Nations continued to operate
after the USSR returned to the Council during the Korean War, some
authorities say this raised a customary norm through State practice,
binding on States.46 The third is action by regional organizations under
the Charter's Chapter VIII, 47 a source of authority for the 1962 Cuban
Missile Crisis Quarantine.48 Although use of Chapter VIII has not been
45
U.N. Charter arts. 10- 11, 13-14, 33, 36-37, 39-41; see also Sydney
D. Bailey & Sam Daws, The Procedure of the UN Security Council 18-21, 23637 (3d ed. 1998); Brownlie, supra note 5, at 15; Jorge Castenada, Legal Effects
of United Nations Resolutions 78-79 (Alba Amoia trans. 1969); Churchill,
supra note 4, at 146-48 (analysis in context of UNCLOS, supra note 2, noting
division of authorities); Goodrich, supra note 4, at 111-29, 133-44, 257-65,
277-87, 290-314; Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, § 16; RESTATEMENT, supra
note 5, § 103(2)(d) & r.n.2; I SIMMA, supra note 4, at 257-87, 298-326, 583-94,
616-43, 717-49.
46 See W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims:
Preventingand Arresting Mass Murder, 40 CASE W. RES. INT'L L. J. 57, 72-73
(2007-08), citing Uniting For Peace Resolution, G.A. Res. 377, 1, U.N. Doc.
A.1775 (Nov. 3, 1950), employed during the Korean War to continue U.N.
operations; Legal Consequences of Constr. of a Wall in the Occupied Palestine
Terr., 2004 I.C.J. 136, 148-51 (adv. op. July 9); Certain Expenses of the United
Nations, 1952 I.C.J. 151, 163-71 (adv. op. July 20). See also Walker, supra
note 22, at 175-77. By parity of reasoning, an otherwise nonbinding Council
resolution, e.g., a call for action, could evolve into a customary norm. The
Supreme Court of the United States has held differently as to another important
General Assembly resolution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948). Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 734 n.12 (2004), declined to accept the Declaration, supra as part
of U.S. customary international law because the then U.S. U.N. Permanent
Representative, Eleanor Roosevelt, had declared the Declaration was not a
binding standard. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980) had
reached the opposite conclusion. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 1358-60
(2008) reached a similar conclusion for International Court of Justice cases,
stating, however, that they were entitled to great respect, but relying in part on
I.C.J. Statute art. 59. This illustrates a dilemma for U.S. decisionmakers;
choices made in conformity with U.S. law standards may not be the same as
public international law norms. A related issue has been the growth of "soft
law," i.e., standards, perhaps coming from an international organization, a
nonbinding agreement or a nongovernmental organization (hereinafter NGO),
that deserve consideration, even though they have not yet ascended to the status
of a source of law. Aust, supra note 13, at 52-53.
47 U.N. Charter ch. VIII; see also Goodrich et al., supra note 4, at 35564; 1 SvmmA, supra note 4, at 807-95.
48 Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2, at 262; Walker, supra note
22, at 179; see also Abram Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (1974); Robert A.
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as media-visible as Chapter VII for situations involving breaches of the
peace or threats to international peace and security, it has played a role
throughout the Charter era and will do so in the future.4 9 All of these
situations invoke the same issues raised with respect to self-defense,
whether it is individual State self-defense, collective self-defense under
a self-defense alliance, coalition self-defense, or perhaps self-defense
involving a response against an adversary that is not a State. 50 The
same standards for knowledge, or what a decisionmaker should
reasonably know, should apply to actions under these Council or
Assembly resolutions, whether the decisionmaker is the Council, the
Assembly or a commander operating under a resolution. 51
I have proposed a multifactor analysis to resolve these kinds of
issues. 52 Space does not allow repeating it here, except to say that the
foregoing Part I describes real problems, for which a ready, rulesdriven solution is not easy, and that a multifactor analysis, taking into
account the LOAC and other factors in self-defense and U.N. law
oriented situations may be a better approach. Besides these general
issues, there are specific situations where self-defense claims may arise
in connection with ports and the territorial sea around ports.
The S.S. Maersk Alabama standoff with pirates in the Indian
Ocean off Somalia in April 2009 partially illustrates the foregoing
analysis. On April 8 four Somali pirates armed with assault rifles
boarded the Maersk Alabama, a U.S.-flag vessel with a 20-member
crew of U.S. citizens, on the high seas. The ship was bound for
Mombasa, Kenya, with a World Food Program relief cargo destined for
Somalia.
The master, Richard Phillips, told the crew to lock
themselves in a compartment and volunteered himself as a hostage in
return for release of the rest of the crew. The pirates put Phillips into a
Maersk Alabama lifeboat. The rest of the Maersk Alabama crew fought
them and retained control of the ship. All pirates except those aboard

Divine, The Cuban Missile Crisis (1971); Michael Dobbs, One Minute to

Midnight: Kennedy, Krushchev and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear War
(2008); Robert F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile
Crisis (1969).
49 1 SIMMA, supra note 4, at 843-53 describes the work of the
Organization of American States, the Organization of African Unity, the Arab
League and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in
resolving regional crises.
50 See supra notes 3-22 and accompanying text.
51 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
52 See Walker, supranote 15.
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and holding Phillips in the boat left for the mainland. 53 Operating
hundreds of miles away on antipiracy patrol, the destroyer U.S.S.
Bainbridge raced to the scene and hove to near Maersk Alabama and its
lifeboat. The four pirates aboard the boat threatened to kill Phillips if
they were not paid ransom, although other pirates ashore declared that
all the pirates wanted was a safe route to shore and payment of a
negotiated ransom later.54 As part of the negotiations Bainbridge took
the lifeboat in tow and supplied it with food and water; at one point the
pirates fired on the Bainbridge; there was no return fire. On April 12
the Navy rescued Captain Phillips; SEALS marksmen had shot the
three pirates holding him. Those aboard Bainbridge had observed
Phillips "in imminent danger" when a pirate was seen with an assault
rifle at his back; they had also observed that his captors were getting
edgy. The fourth pirate was then aboard Bainbridge receiving medical
help from a wound, probably inflicted by a Maersk Alabama crewman,
and negotiating Phillips' fate. He has been charged with U.S. law
violations in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
53 Apparently the pirates began with the idea of exchanging Phillips for
one of their number seized by the merchantman's crew. The Maersk Alabama
docked at Mombasa safely with its crew aboard.
Pirates who had
commandeered other merchantmen for ransom were directing those ships, and
other pirate vessels, toward the site of the Maersk Alabama incident, to up the
ante for ransom. Food aid agencies in East Africa have recently complained
about the piracy menace. CBS Broadcasting, Pirates Recapture Captain After
Escape Attempt (Apr. 12, 2009); Sarah Childress & Peter Spiegel, Snipers Kill
Pirates, Save Captain, WALL ST. J., Apr. 13, 2009, at Al; CNN, Hostage
CaptainRescued; Navy Snipers Kill 3 Pirates(Apr. 12, 2009); Chip Cummings
et al., US. CargoShip Repels Pirates,WALL ST. J., Apr. 9, 2009, at Al, A10;
Elizabeth A. Kennedy, Crew Celebrates US Captain's Release with Flares
(Assoc. Press Dispatch, Apr. 12, 2009); Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shank,
Navy Rescues Captain,Killing 3 Pirate Captors,N.Y. Tm~s, Apr. 13, 2009, at
Al.
54 Other U.S. Navy units, including US.S. Halyburton, a guided missile
frigate, and US.S. Boxer, flagship for the multinational task force, also raced to
the scene, and Navy SEALS (Sea, Air, Land, Navy Special Warfare personnel)
parachuted into the water near Bainbridge. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) agents came aboard to help with hostage negotiations. Patrol planes and a
Navy helicopter hovered over the scene. Associated Press, FBI, Navy Try to
Win Release of Ship Captainby Pirates,WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 10, 2009, at
A8; CBS Broadcasting, supra note 53; Childress & Spiegel, supra note 53;
CNN, supra note 53; Kennedy, supra note 53; McFadden & Shank, supra note
53. US.S. Bainbridge was the name of the U.S. Navy's first destroyer (DD-l),
and honors William Bainbridge, who led a U.S. squadron against the Barbary
Pirates in 1815-16; he had been their prisoner for 19 months after his previous
command, the frigate Philadelphia,ran aground outside Tripoli harbor.
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York. Phillips and the crew were debriefed, received medical assistance
as needed, and headed home to the United States. Some pirate
chieftains threatened U.S. mariners' lives as a response to the deaths of
their colleagues in crime; reaction to this ranged from fear for more
risks to calls for arming merchant ship crews or more military action.55
The LOS denounces high seas piracy; 56 Bainbridge could have
operated under those principles if no U.S. nationals were aboard the
pirated vessel or if no collective self-defense arrangement, through a
formal treaty like the North Atlantic Treaty (i.e., NATO), a coalition, or
specific request from captured nationals' countries, invoked selfdefense. 57 However, because the master, a U.S. citizen, was a captive
of the pirates, and the United States, like many countries, claims a right
of self-defense to succor its endangered nationals, 58 the destroyer and
55 Unlike this incident, an India Navy warship returned fire from
pirates, and an Italian-flag cruise ship with Israeli security guards aboard fired
on pirates to fend them off. U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates said that a
stable Somalia government was the key to the problem. Although some NATO
countries have released ship hijackers after seizing them, several States, France,
Kenya and Netherlands among them, have begun cases against captured pirates.
Additionally, local Somali leaders and the Somali government may begin
acting against the pirates. Associated Press, NATO's Lack of Authority Means
It Must Let PiratesGo, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 19, 2009, at AI9; Associated
Press, Pirates Fought Off by Security, WINSTON-SALEM J., Apr. 27, 2009, at
A7; Chad Bray, Somali Teenager Is Indictedfor Piracyin Cargo-ShipSeizure,
WALL ST. J., May 20, 2009, at A2; Childress & Spiegel, supra note 53; CNN,
supra note 53; John W. Miller & Peter Spiegel, U.S. Weighs Changes in
Strategy to Fight Pirates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 18-19, 2009, at A9; Jeffery
Gettleman, For Somali Pirates, Worst Enemy May Be Waiting Back on Shore,
N.Y. TIMEs, May 9, 2009, at A9; Chip Cummings & John W. Miller, Rescue at
Sea Sparks Calls for Firepower, id., Apr. 14, 2009, at A9; Editorial, Saving
Captain Phillips, id., Apr. 13, 2009 (expressing hope for prosecution under
U.S. law); McFadden & Shank, supra note 53; Peter Spiegel, Gates Says
Somalia Government Is Key to Problem, WALL ST. J., Apr. 14, 2009, at A9;
Benjamin Weiser, A Young Somali in Manhattan, to Face US. Charges of
Piracy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at Al; see also 18 U.S.C. §§ 1651-53,
1658-60 (2006) (U.S. statutes criminalizing piracy, related offenses); supra
notes 38-41, infra notes 56-67, 111-19 and accompanying text.
56 UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 100-07; High Seas Convention, supra
note 8, arts. 14-22. Language in recent U.N. Security Council resolutions
generally denouncing piracy would have lent support to action under the LOS.
See also supra notes 38-41, infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
57 See supranotes 3-35 and accompanying text.
58 Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2 & n.29 at 261; see also infra
Parts Ill.A.5.a, lI.A.5.b, further analyzing this situation and humanitarian
intervention, i.e., intervention to succor other countries' endangered nationals.
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other U.S. forces and personnel (e.g., Navy SEALS and FBI agents
trained for hostage situations59 ) operated under self-defense principles.
In this case it was at first reactive self-defense; the Maersk Alabama
seizure and hostage-taking had already occurred.
Self-defense
principles trumped the LOS antipiracy rules. 60 Undoubtedly the United
States operated with the LOS antipiracy rules and U.S. hostage
situation rules as conditioning factors in the standoff.6 ' Perhaps it was
interpretive application of these rules in the self-defense context,
concern for hitting Phillips or concern that the pirates might kill him in
response, that led Bainbridge crewmen in a small ship's boat not to
return the pirates' small arms fire directed toward a Bainbridgeboat or
the ship. 62 The Bainbridge boat crew or the destroyer could have
responded in reactive self-defense.
When it was seen that Captain Phillips was in "imminent
danger," an anticipatory self-defense situation arose; hostile intent
against a U.S. national had been demonstrated. The need to act was
instant and overwhelming, with no alternative; it also had to be
necessary and proportional.63 Only Phillips' three captors were shot.
The weakness of arguments against anticipatory self-defense is
illustrated by this situation. Few if any would say that the Navy had to
wait to see Phillips shot before responding; the pirate holding a gun on
Phillips was clearly a proper object of anticipatory response. The two
pirates not directly involved in guarding Phillips were operating in a
common cause and were also subject to an anticipatory self-defense
response. Nothing under the circumstances would have preventing
them from grabbing their assault rifles and killing Phillips when his
guardian was shot. Whether pirates' later threat to kill U.S. mariners in
the future can support an anticipatory self-defense response will depend
on circumstances: credibility of the threat, display of hostile intent,
whether the need to act is instant and overwhelming with no other
59 See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
60 U.N. Charter arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 3-35 and
accompanying text.
61 Cf. Walker, supra note 15; see also supra notes 53-55 and
accompanying text.
62 In a nearly contemporaneous incident, in a shootout between pirates
and the French Navy, which rescued hostages from a captured yacht, two
pirates and a hostage died from gunfire. Earlier India's Navy sank a Thailand
fishing boat, killing mariners and pirates after pirates fired on an India warship.
CBS Broadcasting, supra note 53; Slobhan Gorman, American Captain Tries to
Escape from Sea Pirates, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11-12, 2009, at A5; Miller &
Spiegel, supra note 55.
63 See supra notes 14, 20, 35 and accompanying text.
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alternative, and necessity and proportionality of the response. If pirates
attack in the future, the situation may become a reactive self-defense
situation.
The Maersk Alabama incident also partially illustrates analysis of
the relationship between U.N. actions under the Charter and the LOS.
The Security Council passed resolutions deciding, 64 with Somalia's65
consent, to allow pursuing pirates into Somalia territorial waters.
These trumped the LOS rules 6 6 governing territorial sea passage. Thus

if the incident had moved into Somalia waters, the Bainbridge and
other antipiracy forces would have had authority to enter those waters,
despite LOS restrictions on military actions in the territorial sea, 67 to
deal with the pirates and effect rescues. Other naval forces in the
antipiracy patrol could have responded in collective self-defense as
well.
B. SPECIAL SELF-DEFENSESITUATIONS INVOLVING PORTS
AND THE TERRITORIAL SEA

There are situations where the LOS applicable to ports and the
territorial sea may intersect with the law of self-defense.
1. WARSHIP AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT IMMUNITY;
WARSHIP AND MILITARY
AIRCRAFT SELF-DEFENSE
Warships as defined in UNCLOS 68 and military aircraft 69 have

complete immunity in the territorial sea, in internal waters and in ports,
which are usually located in internal waters, whether these be the U.S.
64

U.N. Charter arts. 25, 48, 94, 103; see also supra notes 37-51 and

accompanying text.
65 S.C. Res.

1846, 1851, supra note 38; see also supra notes 38-41,

infra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
66 UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts.
17-32; Territorial Sea Convention,

supra note 2, arts. 14-23.
67
68
69

See infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
See supra note 39 and accompanying text..
Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 2, art. 3(b)

defines state aircraft as aircraft used in military services. San Remo Manual,
supra note 27, 13(j); Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 2.2.1, citing AFP
110-31, supra note 27, 2-4b, define military aircraft as aircraft operated by
commissioned units of the armed forces of a nation, bearing that nation's
military markings, commanded by a member of the armed forces and manned
by a crew subject to regular armed forces discipline.
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territorial sea, U.S. internal waters or U.S. ports, or foreign territorial
seas, internal waters or ports. 70 Although warships have a right of
innocent passage in foreign States' territorial seas, military aircraft do
not; warships and military aircraft must obtain prior permission to enter
foreign States' internal waters and ports.7' Warships in port and
steaming in the territorial sea or internal waters and ports, or moored or
anchored in ports, and military aircraft lawfully flying over them, also
have a right of individual and collective self-defense, 2 as much as the
States whose flag they fly have this right. This applies to foreign and
U.S. ports. An example of an incident in a foreign port was the attack
on the U.S.S. Cole in a Yemen port; the Cole had the right of selfdefense. U.S. responses to attacking Japanese aircraft and submarines
on Pearl Harbor Day in Hawaii and afterward until the U.S. war
declaration were examples of self-defense following an attack in a U.S.
port.
70

UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 32 (warship territorial seas immunity,

subject to being asked to leave the territorial sea if in noncompliance with
innocent passage, flag
State responsibility for damage caused by warship noncompliance), 96
(warship high seas immunity), 236 (immunity from environmental damage
claims); High Seas Convention, supra note 8, art. 8(1) (warship high seas
immunity); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 22 (warship territorial
sea immunity, subject to being asked to leave the territorial sea if in
noncompliance with innocent passage); Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,
2.2.2 (military aircraft sovereign immunity). Naval auxiliaries, State-owned
vessels owned by or under the exclusive control of a State's armed forces, also
enjoy immunity. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 32, 96, 236; Territorial Sea
Convention, supra art. 22; High Seas Convention, supra art. 8. There are many
ships under the U.S. flag that fall within this category. See generally Thomas
& Duncan, supra
2.1.3. Other States may similarly provide for naval
auxiliaries, e.g., the United Kingdom's Ships Taken Up from Trade (STUFT)
program, used during the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war. U.S. military contract
aircraft, i.e., civilian planes that the U.S. Air Mobility Command has chartered,
are state aircraft entitled to immunity if the United States so designates them.
Id. 2.2.3. Other countries may employ similar procedures.
71 Submarines must navigate on the surface and fly their
flag.
UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 18-23; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2,
arts. 14-15; Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 2, art.
3(c); COLOMBOS, supra note 28, § 274, at 262; Thomas & Duncan, supra note
2,
1.4.1-1.4.2, 2.3.1-2.3.2.4; Baumgartner & Oliver, supra note 1, at 50.
72 Cf. Int'l L. Ass'n, Committee on Maritime Neutrality,
Helsinki
Principles on the Law of Maritime Neutrality, May 30, 1998, Principle 5. 1. 1, in
International Law Association, Report of the 68th Conference, Taipei, 1998, at
496, 506 (1998) (hereinafter Helsinki Principles), reprinted in SCHINDLER &
TOMAN, supra note 27, at 1425, 1428.
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By extension of these principles, warship(s) or military aircraft
guarding a convoy in territorial waters, if they are otherwise lawfully
exercising the right of convoy granted by the territorial state,73 may
exercise self-defense to protect themselves and the convoy.
2. DEFENSE ZONES IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA
During World Wars I and II, the United States established coastal
defense zones to limit shipping into certain ports, including Charleston,
South Carolina.74 The law of the sea conventions allow a coastal state
to suspend, temporarily, in specified areas of its territorial sea the
innocent passage of foreign ships if such suspension is essential to
protect its security, including weapons exercises. The suspension shall
take effect only after being duly published. 75 This provision would
seem not to forbid defense zones if the coastal state legitimately claims
a right of self-defense and the claimed right of defense is necessary and
proportional under the circumstances.76 The law of the sea says
nothing about establishing these zones in ports or internal waters, but
73 UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 19 publishes an exhaustive list of actions

ships may not take while in territorial sea innocent passage. Cf Joint Statement
by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 1
3, Sept. 23, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1445 (1989). Some commentators say this may not

be an exclusive list of prohibited actions. I O'Connell, supra note 28, at 270;
Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 2.3.2.1 n.27. However, if a coastal State
allows a military convoy to transit its territorial sea, this permission includes
the convoy's right to defend itself through its accompanying warships or
military aircraft.
74 Japan declared zones extending seven miles into the high seas during
the 1904-05 Russia-Japan war. Some U.S. zones remained in effect until 1956.
COLOMBOS, supra note 28, § 558; 3 Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law
Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States § 720 (3d ed. 1945-47);
Brunson MacChesney, Situation, Documents and Commentaries on Recent
Developments, in INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUATION AND DOCUMENTS 1956, 51
INT'L L. STUD. SER. 1, 603-04 (1957) (describing U.S. zones); 2 O'Connell,

supra note 28, at 1109; 2 Lassa Oppenheim, International Law § 319a (Hersch
Lauterpacht ed. 1955); Walker, supra note 22, at 403; L.F.E. Goldie, Maritime
War Zones and Exclusion Zones, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, 64 INT'L
L. STUD. SER. 156, 158-60 (Horace B. Robertson, Jr. ed., 1991).
75 The suspension shall not discriminate in form or fact among foreign
ships. UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 25(3); Territorial Sea Convention, supra
note 2, art. 16(3).
76 Although it would be highly unusual, presumably a defense area
proclaimed under a right of anticipatory self-defense (necessary, proportional,
with an instantaneous need admitting of no other alternative) would also be

lawful. See supra notes 3-35 and accompanying text.
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any state establishing a port or internal waters zone must take into
account the effect on territorial sea innocent passage and access to
ports.77 Thus a coastal state might establish one of these zones to
defend against an anticipated terrorist attack as well as under principles
of anticipated or reactive self-defense against an enemy foreign state.
These zones must be distinguished from permanent high seas
defense zones established by a handful of States, notably Libya and
Democratic Peoples' Republic of Korea (North Korea), extending well
out into the high seas. These zones, sometimes styled security zones,
violate international law,78 whether viewed from limitations on selfdefense (necessity, proportionality, and in the case of anticipatory selfdefense, admitting of no other alternative),79 or the freedom of the
seas. 80 They must also be distinguished from temporary zones declared
for an immediate area of military operations. 1
3. ADIZs

International law distinguishes defense zones from aircraft
detection and identification zones (ADIZs), which the United States
and other countries have declared. An ADIZ is an area where U.S.
aircraft and their tracking support systems monitor for incoming
aircraft, e.g., the U.S. territorial sea and adjacent high seas waters
(contiguous zone, EEZ, seas above the U.S. continental shelf82)
The legal basis for an ADIZ is a nation's right to reasonable
83
etbihdt
conditions for entry into its territory.
Although established to
77 Nonmilitary shipping has freedom of access to ports, subject to
safety, security, etc. considerations. Baumgartner & Oliver, supra note I, at 3449.
78 RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 511 cmt. k; J. ASHLEY ROACH &
ROBERT W. SMITH,

UNITED STATES

RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME

CLAIMS 6.2 (2d ed. 1996); Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 2.4.4; Walker,
supra note 22, at 267.
79 See supra notes 3-35 and accompanying text.
80 UNCLOS, supra note 2, pmbl., arts. 87, 88, 301; High Seas
Convention, supra note 8, pmbl., arts. 1, 2.
81 See infra Part 1I.B.4.
82 Although LOS treaties describe these areas separately, their waters
outside of the territorial sea are part of the high seas. UNCLOS, supra note 2,
arts. 33, 55-85; Continental Shelf Convention, supra note 8, arts. 1, 3; Fishing
Convention, supra note 8, arts. 1-2; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2,
art. 24.
83 Whether coastal States can apply these regulations to aircraft passing
through an ADIZ and not inbound to the coastal State is not settled. AFP 110-
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facilitate defense of the United States and other coastal countries from
incoming aircraft from inter alia the high seas,84 ADIZs can help
identify drug runner aircraft, aircraft identified as a possible airborne
terrorist attack on U.S. territory and other hostile threats. Aircraft
operating in the high seas ADIZ in identification roles have LOS
freedom of navigation rights, just like Navy and Coast Guard ships and
other military vessels. 85 Operating radar and similar devices over high
seas areas does not violate the law of the sea, so long as they do not
interfere with other lawful high seas uses.86 So long as radar emissions
and the like do not interfere with the right of innocent passage or other
rights in the atmosphere over the high seas, they are a lawful use of the
territorial sea by the coastal state. The coastal state has a right to
overfly its own internal waters, ports and territorial sea as part of its
sovereign territory, so long as the aircraft does not interfere with
innocent passage. Once an aircraft in a hostile act or acting with hostile
intent or is detected, the law of self-defense comes into play 87 in
response to a threat of harm to the coastal state and its ports. However,
an ADIZ is not a self-defense measure in and of itself.
4. EXCLUDING SHIPPING FROM AREAS OF MILITARY
OPERATIONS IN THE TERRITORIAL SEA
A customary law of naval warfare rule allows belligerents to
exclude neutral merchant shipping and aircraft from, and to ask thirdstate warships to leave, high seas areas near an immediate area of
military operations if hostilities are taking place or will occur in the
near future, or where belligerent forces are operating, e.g., conducting
visit and search. A belligerent cannot deny territorial sea innocent
passage to neutral States' coasts or to close an international strait to
transit or innocent passage unless another route of similar convenience

31, supra note 27,

2-1g; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 2.5.2.3;
5, § 521, r.n.2; Marjorie M. Whiteman, 4 Digest of

RESTATEMENT, supra note

International Law 496-97; Walker, supra note 22, at 410; Elizabeth Caudra,
Note, Air Defense Identification Zones: CreepingJurisdictionin the Airspace,
18 VA. J. INT'LL. 485 (1978).
84

See 14 C.F.R. §§ 99.1-99.49 (2008) for current U.S. ADIZ areas and

regulations.
85 UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 87(1), 88, 301; High Seas Convention,
supranote 8, arts. 1, 2.
86 UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 87(1); High Seas Convention, supra
note 8, art. 2 (high seas freedoms listed are inter alia freedoms to use the high
seas).

87 See supranotes 3-35 and accompanying text.
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is open to neutral traffic. 8 Although there is apparently no state
practice with respect to the territorial sea during the Charter era, it
would seem that coastal state naval forces could, under self-defense
principles and limitations and the Charter's trumping principles, 89
impose a similar temporary zone in its territorial waters and ports by
analogy. This situation is more likely today, given possibilities of 12mile claims for a territorial sea 90 around ports as part of a state's coast,
and those waters' expanse compared with the former three-mile rule. It
would seem, also, that such an exclusion could be imposed in a selfdefense response where the territorial sea is that of the state that
initiated the hostile act or displayed hostile intent in anticipatory selfdefense situations 9 ' as part of the self-defense response. On the other
hand, a state responding in self-defense might not be able to establish
such a zone in a third state's waters, i.e., where an attack originating in
another state's forces occurs in a third state's waters, unless the third
state allows the zone, 92 or unless the establishment of the zone would
be a lawful extension of the inherent right to self-defense.

88 Declaration Concerning Laws of Naval Warfare, art. 1, Feb.

26,

1909, 208 Consol. T.S. 338; Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, supra note
10, 4; COLOMBOS, supra note 28, § 500; Commission of Jurists to Consider
and Report Upon the Revision of the Rules of Air Warfare, Hague Air Rules,
supra note 27, art. 30, reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 315,
320; Helsinki Principles, supra note 72, Principle 3.3 & cmt.; Institute of
International Law, The Laws of Naval War Between Belligerents: Oxford
Manual on Naval Warfare, art. 50 (Aug. 9, 1913) (hereinafter Oxford Manual),
reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra at 1123, 1130; San Remo Manual,
supra note 27, 146; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at 1109-12; 2 Oppenheim,
supra note 74, § 325b; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 7.8; Robert W.
Tucker, Blockade, in THE LAW OF WAR AND NEUTRALITY AT SEA, 50 INT'L L.
STUD. SER. 1, 300-01 (1955); Walker, supra note 22, at 395.
89 U.N. Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 3-35 and
accompanying text.
90 Coastal States have sovereignty over their claimed territorial seas.
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 3; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 1;
Convention on International Civil Aviation, supra note 2, arts. 1, 2; see also
supra notes 2, 8 and accompanying text.. The United States claims a 12-mile
territorial sea. President Reagan, supra note 8.
91 See supra notes 3-35 and accompanying text.
92 If the third State is a self-defense treaty party to, e.g., the North
Atlantic Treaty, supra note 17, it would seem that permission would not be
necessary if establishing a zone is seen as lawful collective self-defense unless
other agreements under the Treaty provide otherwise or consensus under the
Treaty is necessary.
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5. INTERVENTION MISSIONS FROM THE HIGH SEAS
There are five situations where other States' military forces
might enter a coastal state's territorial sea and often its ports or internal
waters:
(a) intervention to succor other States'
nationals in peril of their lives because of a chaotic
situation in the coastal state and its port(s), which
may be the natural site for landing a rescue mission;
(b) humanitarian intervention, now termed by
some the duty to protect, where a coastal state is
denying indigenous nationals their basic human
rights, and for which intervention in ports might be
better sites for carrying out the mission;
(c) intervention after an overwhelming natural
disaster, where the coastal state is in difficulty coping
with the disaster, and ports would be the better sites
for landing aid, rather than beaches or airfields
damaged by the disaster, or intervention to combat
rampant international criminality, such as piracy, in
the territorial sea;
(d) intervention to combat the international
drug trade, or under the Proliferation Security
Initiative to deal with weapons of mass destruction
transport on the high seas; and
(e) rescue intervention, where the coastal state
is incapable of rescuing persons in imminent peril on
the sea, perhaps in the territorial sea near a port.
All five missions implicate a cardinal principle of the Charter
prohibiting other States' action that involves the threat or use of force
against the coastal state's territorial integrity or political
independence. 93 These scenarios will not always involve self-defense
issues 94 or actions under Charter law, 95 but they may.

93 U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also supra note 32 and accompanying

text.
94 See supra notes 3-35 and accompanying text.

95 See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
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a. INTERVENTION TO SUCCOR SAME-STATE OR OTHER STATES'
NATIONALS IN PERIL
The U.S. view, and the view of other countries, is that their
forces may enter a coastal state's territory, including its territorial sea,
internal waters or ports, to rescue their nationals that are in peril due to
violence or threats to their safety in the coastal state.96 This right of
intervention extends to those States' nationals whose governments
authorize the intervening state's action.97 States may also intervene
collectively, a early Twentieth Century case being the Boxer Rebellion
intervention.9" The right of individual or collective self-defense is the
basis for this action; like all self-defense actions, these operations are
subject to principles of necessity, proportionality and, in the case of
anticipatory self-defense, instantaneous and admitting of no other
alternative. 99 The U.N. Security Council, or the General Assembly
acting through the Uniting for Peace resolution, may direct or authorize
intervention. °° The 1961 Congo rescue operation after the colonial
power's departure' 0 ' is an example of U.N.-approved intervention. If a
coastal state allows intervention, that permission eliminates issues of
violating the coastal state's territorial integrity or political
independence. 10 2 However, issues of necessity and proportionality, or
U.N. resolution compliance, may remain.

96 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty,
Responsibility to Protect:
Report of the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty 1 4.27 (2001) (hereinafter Responsibility to
Protect); Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2 n.29, at 261. James Cable,
Gunboat Diplomacy 1919-1991, at 158-213 (3d ed. 1994) recounts many such
incidents, which, particularly before World War 1I, often were launched with
other purposes in mind, e.g., protecting business interests or forcing a political
decision, including occupation of territory by the intervening country, on the
target State.
97 Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2 n.29, at 260.
98 See Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion (2001). Some of these early
Twentieth Century multilateral interventions had other, less lofty goals in mind
as well. See supra note 96.
99 See supra notes 3-35 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
101 Klinton W. Alexander, Ignoring the Lessons of the Past: The Crisis
in Darfur and the Casefor HumanitarianIntervention, 15 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 1, 14-15 (2005).
12 Cf
U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
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b. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
Humanitarian intervention, which some now style the
responsibility to protect, involves a maritime power's intervening in a
coastal state to succor third States' nationals if the third state has not
requested or approved intervention, or if the coastal state has
committed gross human rights or humanitarian law violations against
its own people or an indigenous group within its territory.' 0 3 The state
of necessity doctrine, under which intervening state or states violate
international law 10 4 to end a greater harm and violation of international
103 The debate has rekindled since NATO's 1999 campaign in the

former Yugoslavia, responding to the Kosovar repression. No clear resolution
exists today. See High-Level Panel, supra note 7, T 203 (emerging norm in
2001; collective responsibility to protect, exercisable by U.N. Security Council
to authorize military intervention as a last resort if a government is powerless
or unwilling to act); World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, 77 138-39, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/60/l (Oct. 24, 2005) (sovereignty carries a responsibility to act);
Responsibility to Protect, supra note 96,
2.14, 2.28-2.33, 4.1-4.19, 4.28,
4.37, 4.41, 6.28-6.35 (if State unable or unwilling to protect its population,
international community has duty to act in exceptional circumstances, subject
to limiting conditions, with first duty lying with Council, General Assembly,
regional organizations); Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2 n.29 at 261
(evolving concept has not received general acceptance, citing early
commentators); Alexander, supra note 101, at I (forcible humanitarian
intervention justified if human rights violations in a State are threat to
international peace and security); Carlo Focarelli, The Responsibility to Protect
Doctrineand HumanitarianIntervention, 13 J.CONFLICT & SEC. L. 191, 209-13
(2008) (not customary norm); Christopher Joyner, "The Responsibility to
Protect": HumanitarianConcern and the Lawfulness ofArmed Intervention, 47
VA. J. INT'L L. 693, 704, 720 (2007) (a norm in process of becoming a legal
principle); Ved Nanda, The Protection of Human Rights Under International
Law: Will the U.N. Human Rights Council and the Emerging New Norm
"Responsibilityto Protect" Make a Difference?, 35 DENVER J. INT'L & POL'Y
353 (2007); George K. Walker, Principles for Collective Humanitarian
Intervention to Succor Other Countries' Imperiled Indigenous Nationals, 18
Am. U. INT'L L. REV. 35 (2002) (humanitarian intervention to aid oppressed
indigenous nationals lawful under state of necessity, subject to limiting factors;
survey of early cases, law immediately following Kosovo intervention). For
earlier examples of humanitarian intervention, see Cable, supra note 96, at 161,
172-74, 185.
04 I.e., violating U.N. Charter art. 2(4), which forbids violating a
State's territorial integrity or political independence. A State may not invoke
necessity as a ground for precluding an otherwise wrongful act unless the act is
the only means for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
and imminent peril, and the act does not seriously impair an essential interest of
the State or States toward which the obligation exists, or the international
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law, is one basis for this action. If a coastal state allows intervention,
that permission eliminates issues of violation of its territorial integrity
or political independence. 0 5 Similarly, if a U.N. resolution authorizes
intervention, 10 6 that eliminates a claim of violation of territorial
integrity or political independence.
However, factorial issues of
necessity0 7 and proportionality, or compliance with the resolution, may
remain.1

c. INTER VENTION IN THE WAKE OFA NA TURAL DISASTER OR
RAMPANT INTERNA TIONAL CRIMINALITY, SUCH AS PIRACY

Recent natural disasters and the rise of piracy off some coasts,
notably Somalia but also elsewhere around the world, raise questions of
intervention in those situations.
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, earthquakes in Afghanistan,
China and Pakistan and hurricanes that devastated Myanmar and U.S.
Gulf of Mexico coastal areas, raise issues over when and under what
circumstances third States or a multinational force may intervene in the
territory of the afflicted state(s) to help with disaster relief if the state(s)
There is only a
apparently cannot cope with the emergency.10 8
patchwork of treaties covering disaster assistance, some of them crisisspecific; most are bilateral, applying between European States.' 9 "Soft
law," i.e., guidelines for acting after a disaster, have been developed.10

community as a whole. A State may not invoke necessity as a ground for
precluding wrongfulness if the international obligation precludes invoking
necessity, or the invoking State contributes to the situation of necessity. ILC
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4, art. 25 & M 1-21, 2001
ILC Rep., supra note 4, at 194-206, reprinted in Crawford, supra note 4, at
178-86. State of necessity is not the same as necessity as a qualification for
invoking the right of self-defense or as a qualification of standards for ordering
an attack under the LOAC. See also supra notes 3-35, infra note 234 and
accompanying text.
'0' U.N. Charter art. 2(4); see also supra note 36 and accompanying
text.
106 See Alexander, supra note 101, at 22-28 (U.N.-authorized
interventions in Iraq, Somalia, Yugoslavia, Haiti); see also supra notes 37-51
and accompanying text.
107 See generally supra notes 3-51 and accompanying text.
108 Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 4.3.2 n.29, at 260 take the view
that a serious danger to a nation's territory because of a natural catastrophe may
justify intervention.
109 David Fisher, The Law of International Disaster Response:
Overview and Ramifications for Military Actors, in Global Legal Challenges:
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Recently rampant piracy along and off its coast, the longest in
Africa, has beset Somalia, which has not had a functioning government
for over 10 years. Vessels of all sizes, from pleasure yachts to large
tankers and containerships, have been seized. Although most ships
have are manned by merchantmen employed by private shipping
interests, the yachts have been navigated by pleasure boaters, and there
have been seizures of ships bearing food aid cargoes under U.N.
programs. In all cases the pirates are not interested in the ships or
taking lives but in ransom for the vessels and their cargoes.'
The LOS dealing with high seas piracy has been in place a long
time, 1 2 but there is little law governing inshore pirates, i.e., where
Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications and Natural Disasters
293, 296-99 (Int'l L. Stud. v. 83, Michael D. Karsten ed. 2007). Two general
international efforts, the International Relief Union, see Convention
Establishing an International Relief Union, with Statute, July 12, 1937, 135
L.N.T.S. 247, and Draft Convention on Expediting the Delivery of Emergency
Assistance, 1984, failed. Fisher, supra at 295.
110 Evan Carlin, Australian Defence Force Experience with NonGovernment Organizations in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief
Operations, in Global Legal Challenges, supra note 90, at 267, 270; Fisher,
supra note 90, at 300-01, inter alia citing U.N. General Assembly Resolution
46/182, Strengthening of the Coordination of Humanitarian Emergency
Assistance of the United Nations, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46/182 (Dec. 19, 1991);
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs,
Guidelines on the Use of Foreign Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster
Relief, (Rev. 1, Nov. 2007) (Some States including the United States, NATO
listed among conference participants), available at http://ochaonline.un.org/
(visited Feb.6, 2009); ICRC, Principles of Conduct for the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent and NGOs in Disaster Relief Programmes (1994,
updated 2004), available at http://www.irc.org/publicat/conduct/code.asp
(visited Feb. 6, 2009) (462 NGOs, United States among signatories). The
Resolution, supra and these guidelines and principles are not per se binding
law, but they may elevate to that status with practice under them that is
recognized as law. See, e.g., supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text
(nonmandatory U.N. Security Council or General Assembly resolutions or soft
law may grow into custom with observance of them as binding law).
111 Lives have been lost, however. Several pirates and Thailand
fishermen were killed by the India Navy after pirates fired first, a yacht crew
member and two pirates were killed when the French Navy rescued hostages,
and U.S. Navy sharpshooters killed three pirates as it rescued the master of a
U.S.-flag merchantman. See supra notes 55, 62 and accompanying text..
112 UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts.
100-07; High Seas Convention,
supra note 8, arts. 19-22, which apply only on the high seas; see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 7, 381-84 (2006) (special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, which includes the high seas, "any other waters within the
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pirates lurk in a state's territorial waters or establish dens ashore, which
has been the case in Somalia." 3 Naval units must usually seek coastal
state permission to continue pursuing pirates into the territorial sea;
pursuit must end if the coastal state denies territorial seas entry for that
purpose. 1 4 However, the state of necessity doctrine suggests that in
some cases territorial sea entry may be justified, " 5 and if the pirate uses
an aircraft, which undoubtedly has no authorization to enter coastal
state airspace, pursuit may be more justifiable. 1 6 If the pirate has been
so foolish as to display hostile intent or a hostile act toward a warship,
pursuit in self-defense may also be more justifiable. 1 17 In any of these
cases the coastal state should be notified promptly. An unresolved
issue is other States' action in situations of terrorism or other
international crimes, e.g., pursuing those accused of genocide, war
crimes or8 crimes against humanity if they are aboard a vessel or an
aircraft." 18

admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States," as well as U.S.registered ships, aircraft; U.S. Code provisions for crime of piracy); Churchill
& Lowe, supra note 5, at 209-11; COLOMBOs, supra note 28, §§ 457-64; 2
O'Connell, supra note 28, at 967-83; RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 522(2)(a)
& cmt. c, r.n.2; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 3.5. In the case of the
Somali pirate in U.S. custody in connection with the April 2009 Maersk
Alabama incident, there is U.S. jurisdiction to try him; Maersk Alabama was a
U.S. flag merchantman.
113 See supra notes 38-41, 55-67 and accompanying text.
114 Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 3.5.3.2.
115 See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text; cf Thomas &
Duncan, supra note 2, 3.5.3.2. The hot pursuit doctrine, to be applied to a
ship fleeing a coastal State's territorial sea, UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. I11,
High Seas Convention, supra note 8, art. 23, might be argued by analogy, but
these articles declare hot pursuit must end if the fleeing ship reaches its flag
State's or a third State's territorial sea.
116 See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
"' U.N. Charter arts 51, 103; see also supra notes 3-35 and
accompanying text.
118 A coastal State may police its own territorial sea and ports for
pirates and pirate activity aboard foreign flag ships as well as vessels flying its
flag. See UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 27(1) (arrest authority for any person in
connection with an onboard crime [i.e., piracy] during foreign flag ship's
passage if consequences of the crime extend to the coastal State, or if the crime
would "disturb the peace of the country or the good order" of the territorial
sea); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 19 (same): see also 18
U.S.C. §§ 7, 381-84 (2006) (special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, which includes the high seas, "any other waters within the
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United States," as well as U.S.registered ships, aircraft; U.S. Code provisions for crime of piracy); Churchill

378

SOUTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW AND BUSINESS

[Vol. 5.347

Here again issues of violating nonconsenting States' territorial
integrity or political independence arise, and perhaps the necessity
doctrine and self-defense in the case of the pirates if it can be said that
response to non-state actor outlawry like piracy can be characterized as
self-defense, arise. 19 Affected States can consent to the operation or
assistance, as Pakistan did for earthquake assistance, 20 the United
States did after Hurricane Katrina, 12 1 and as Somalia did for piracy
suppression in its territorial sea. 122 An affected state may decline
assistance, as China and Myanmar recently did for disasters affecting
them. There may be mixed responses by affected States to the same
disaster, as was the case in the tsunami. Indonesia allowed assistance
under certain conditions; 23 other States welcomed it. 124 If the U.N.
Security Council or the General Assembly mandates action, those
resolutions inter25 alia raise issues of compliance, necessity and
proportionality. 1
In two situations, the international drug trade and seaborne
transport of weapons of mass destruction, the United States has
sponsored programs to deal with these threats to the international legal
order; Part I.B.5.d discusses these as they may relate to ports security
and the adjoining territorial sea.

& Lowe, supra note 5, at 97-98; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at 956-63.
Warships have sovereign immunity in the territorial sea. See supra note 70 and
accompanying text.
119 U.N. Charter arts. 2(4), 51, 103; see also supra notes 3-35, 103-04
and accompanying text.
120 See generally Ikram ul Haq, Global Disasters: Pakistan's
Experience, in Global Legal Challenges, supra note 90, at 258, 262-63 (U.S.
bilateral assistance through U.S. Central Command; NATO, U.N. High
Commissioner for Refugees, World Health Organization
multilateral
assistance).
121
Kurt Johnson, Disaster Assistance: Key Legal Issues for US
Northern Command, in Global Legal Challenges, supra note 90, at 277, 288
(e.g., assistance from Canada [ground troops], Mexico [mobile kitchen],
Denmark and Germany [portable water pumps]), also advocating that the
United States must adjust its rules for accepting disaster assistance from other
States.
122 See supra notes 38-41, 56-67, 111-19 and accompanying text.
123
Carlin, supra note 110, at 271 (Australia, Singapore, U.S. forces
first on the scene). Id. 271-73 notes mixed results for NGOs involved in the
crisis.
124 Id. 268 (NGO assistance in Sri Lanka, Thailand).
125 See supra notes 37-51 and accompanying text.
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d. COMBATING THE INTERNATIONAL NARCOTIC DRUG TRADE;
THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIA TIVE

For two types of international criminality mentioned in Part
I.B.5(c), the international seaborne narcotic drug trade and ocean
transport of weapons of mass destruction, the United States has
sponsored two programs: drug interdiction by U.S. Navy ships with
U.S. Coast Guard personnel aboard as ship riders, 126 and, more
recently, the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Although drug
traffic suppression and actions under PSI are usually considered high
seas operations, there is a possibility of action under these programs
within the territorial sea, including the U.S. territorial sea, adjacent to
ports.
The United States has negotiated over 20 bilateral treaties
dealing with drug traffic interdiction. These variously allow boarding,
pursuit, entry to investigate, overflight and orders to land aircraft,
seaward of the territorial sea of a state party, with western hemisphere
countries and States with Western Hemisphere dependencies.' 27 These
treaties of themselves do not authorize territorial sea entry; the general
LOS right of hot pursuit 28 does not extend to chasing a suspected drug
transporter into the territorial sea, but might a coastal state agree to
entry for that purpose in individual cases? In any event, self-defense
issues or issues under Charter law can arise in relation to law

126

The U.S. Coast Guard has arrest authority for federal crimes on the

high seas and within waters over which the United States has jurisdiction. 14
U.S.C. § 89 (2006); see also 18 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) (special maritime and
territorial jurisdiction of the United States, which includes the high seas, "any
other waters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the United
States," as well as U.S.-registered ships, aircraft); Churchill & Lowe, supra
note 5, at 219-20; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 3.11.4.3, inter alia citing
46 U.S.C. App. §§ 1901-04 (2006); U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic in
Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances, art. 17, Dec. 20, 1988, T.I.A.S.
No. -,
1582 U.N.T.S. 165 (duty to cooperate to suppress sea traffic, in
conformity with LOS), of which there are 184 parties. United Nations Office
of Legal Affairs, Treaty Section, United Nations Treaty Collection, Multilateral
Treaties, supra note 8.
127 See generally Table A3-a, Maritime Counterdrug/Alien Migrant
Interdiction Agreements (as of Sept. 1, 1997), in Thomas & Duncan, supra
note 2, at 247-48.
128 See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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enforcement in drug interdiction operations and trump interdiction
treaty rules.' 29
The U.S. PSI began in 2003.13° It is a "global effort that aims to
stop shipments of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), their delivery
systems, and related materials worldwide... Actions will be taken...
consistent with relevant international law and frameworks .... PSI is a
lasting initiative that over time will establish a web of
counterproliferation partnerships to prevent trade in WMD, their
It is not a formal
delivery systems, and related materials."
organization, nor does it establish obligations for States but a set of
partnerships establishing bases for cooperation on specific activities.
Initially 11 countries, including the United States, agreed to and
published the PSI.' 3 ' PSI may be another example of "soft law" to
guide conduct; it may harden into custom through time, practice and

129

Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,

3.11.5.1, at 246; see also supra

notes 3-35 and accompanying text.
130 PSI was created after a 2002 incident in which Spanish Special
Forces, acting at the behest of U.S. naval and intelligence personnel, boarded
an un-flagged North Korean ship on the high seas. The S.S. So San was
carrying missile parts to Yemen. After Yemen protested the United States
released the ship and cargo. Baumgartner & Oliver, supra note 1, at 54-55;
Timothy Meyer, Soft Law As Delegation, 32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 888, 933
(2009). In 2002 U.S. and Spanish ships off the Horn of Africa were part of
antiterrorism forces after 9/11. Walker, supra note 17, at 513.
131 Undersecretary for Arms Control & International Security, Bureau
of International Security and Nonproliferation, The Proliferation Security
Initiative (July 28, 2004), http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/other/34726.htm; see
also The Proliferation Security Initiative: Statement of Interdiction Principles
4, 2003), reprinted at id.; Craig H. Allen, A Primer on the
(Sept.
NonproliferationRegime for Maritime Security OperationsForces, 54 NAV. L.
REv. 51 (2007); James Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation
Security Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526 (2004). Today many other States
participate, including flag of convenience countries that have signed away their
registry State boarding rights. Gabriella Blum, Bilateralism, Multilateralism,
and the Architecture of International Law, 49 HARV. INT'L L.J. 323, 340
(2008); Matthew Allen Fitzgerald, Note, Seizing Weapons of Mass Destruction
from Foreign-FlaggedShips on the High Seas Under Article 51 of the Charter,
49 VA. J. INT'L L. 473, 475 (2009). Although PSI is a prior administration's
initiative, agreements to curb nuclear and radioactive materials proliferation
continue. See, e.g., United States Department of State, Bureau of Public
Affairs, Office of the Spokesman, U.S.-New Zealand Arrangement for
Cooperation on Nonproliferation Assistance (Apr. 7, 2009), http://www.state.
gov/r/pa/prs/2009/04/121363.htm.
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acceptance as law. 132 PSI's commitment to international law means
that PSI countries will observe the LOS, which on its face means that
PSI interceptions cannot trump LOS rules for ports, the adjacent
territorial sea and innocent passage. 133 However, cooperating States
might agree to territorial sea entry in cooperation with maritime powers
to implement PSI. 134 PSI cannot trump the right of self-defense or
actions under the Charter.'35
e. RESCUE INTERVENTION
Rescue intervention situations might arise where an aircraft,
perhaps a military aircraft, lawfully navigating over the high seas
develops an emergency and must ditch in the territorial sea or on a
Another possible scenario involves a
beach of a coastal state.
passenger airliner, lawfully en route from one airport to another airport
on a previously-designated air route over land or water, that ditches in a
coastal state's territorial sea or internal waters, or on a coastal beach,
similar to the US Airways Hudson River emergency landing. A third
132

Meyer, supra note 130, at 922, 935. S.C. Res. 1540, U.N. Doc.

S/RES/1540 (2004), passed after PSI became operational in 2003, might be
considered authority for PSI. Nicholas D. Smith, Note, Guarding Pandora's
Box: Strengthening Physical Protection at Facilities that House Weapons of
Mass Destruction,32 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1070-71 (2009).
133 Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg, The Proliferation Security
Initiative: Security vs. Freedom of Navigation?, in International Law
Challenges: Homeland Security and Combating Terrorism 55, 63-64 (Thomas
McK. Sparks & Glenn M. Sulmasy, Int'l L. Stud. v. 81, 2006); for analysis
of innocent passage rules in the piracy context, see supra Part I.B.5(c).
134 Consent of the flag state has been the basis for interceptions on the
high seas. Von Heinegg, The Proliferation,supra note 133, at 65. Coastal
state consent could authorize territorial sea PSI operations; it was part of the
legal basis for antipiracy Security Council resolutions on Somalia. See supra
notes 38-41, 56-67, 111-19 and accompanying text.
135 Fitzgerald, supra note 131, at 477-505; see also supra notes 3-35
A 2005 protocol to the Convention for the
and accompanying text.
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar.
1678 U.N.T.S. 221, adds terrorist acts and
10, 1988, T.I.A.S. No. -,
transporting radioactive material to be used for terrorist purposes, WMD,
fissionable material or material significantly contributing to design,
manufacture or delivery of WMD to the Convention's purview. International
Maritime Organization, 2005 Protocol to the SUA Convention. The protocol is
in force for six States; the Convention binds 152. International Maritime
Organization, Summary of Status of Convention (As of 31 March 2009),
http://www.imo.org/. See also von Heinegg, The Proliferation,supra note 133,
at 65.
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involves a small boat or cruise liner, perhaps in innocent passage or
navigating the high seas, that develops a problem (fire, grounding, or
other accident) and tries to make it ashore but stops in coastal waters.
In all of these cases, if the coastal state cannot assist in rescue, or
chooses not to assist in rescue, perhaps because of limited or no
resources, can a warship or military aircraft (maybe a helicopter) enter
territorial waters, or perhaps land (in the case of an aircraft or warship
small boats) to pick up survivors to take them to safety? Suppose in all
of these cases the rescue platform discharges weapons, e.g., to kill
attacking sharks around the rescue area in the territorial sea.
UNCLOS declares an exclusive list 3 6 of actions a ship may not
take while in innocent passage, among them:
(a) any threat or use of force against the
or political
sovereignty, territorial integrity
independence of the coastal state, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of international
law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of
any kind;

(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any military device;

(/)any other activity not having a direct
bearing on passage. 137
A foreign ship's passage is considered prejudicial to the peace,
good order or security of the coastal state if in the territorial sea it
engages in any of these activities. UNCLOS also provides that
"[p]assage shall be continuous and expeditious. However, passage
136 Some commentators argue that the list is nonexclusive. See supra
note 73 and accompanying text.
137 UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 19(2)(a), 19(2)(b), 19(2)(e), 19(2)(f),
19(2)(1); compare Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 14(4)
("Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State. Such passage shall take place in conformity with
these articles and with other rules of international law.").
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includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so far as the same are
incidental to ordinary navigation or are rendered necessary by force
assistance to persons, ships or
majeure or distress or for... 3 rendering
8
aircraft in danger or distress."'
The first issue relates to a rescuing ship: Would it be
considered innocent passage if it is on a high seas route and enters for
rescue purposes only? Rescue entry does not seem to fit within the
UNCLOS definition of innocent passage: "Passage means navigation
through the territorial sea for

. . .

traversing that sea without entering

internal waters or calling at a roadstead or port facility outside internal
waters; or . . .proceeding to or from internal waters or a call at such
roadstead or facility."'' 3 9 To be sure, if the warship receives permission
to proceed to the coastal state's port to discharge the accident victims,
that might convert what appears not to have begun as innocent passage
into innocent passage.
However, the warship commander might
conclude, or be ordered, to proceed elsewhere with the victims aboard,
maybe to seek better emergency treatment, e.g., in an aircraft carrier
medical facility. There is also the problem of actions taken once in the
territorial sea, assuming it is a valid innocent passage. Would its
actions be taken as a threat by the coastal state? Would shooting sharks
to save someone struggling in the water and needing rescue violate
UNCLOS? Would launching, landing or taking on board a rescue
helicopter or boat violate UNCLOS? Would launching, landing or
taking on board the helicopter or boat be considered launching, landing
or taking on board a military device? Would any of these actions be
considered "any other activity not having a direct bearing on [innocent]
14
passage"? Military aircraft do not have innocent passage rights; 0
even if the foregoing questions are answered favorably for warship
entry and rescue, the answers do not apply to military aircraft flown
from the high seas to effect rescue.
UNCLOS and the High Seas Convention require rescuing
those in peril on the sea if the operation does not seriously endanger the
rescuing ship, or its crew or its passengers, but these articles seem to
apply only to the high seas.14 ' However, the treaties' use of "at sea"
138

UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 18(2) (italics in original); compare

Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2, art. 14(3).
139
UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 18(l); compare Territorial Sea
Convention, supra note 2, art. 14(2).
140 See supra notes 70-71 and accompanying text.
41 Compare UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 98(I)(a), 98(l)(b) with
High Seas Convention, supra note 8, arts. 12(l)(a), 12(1)(b); see also
International Convention for Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect
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means that they apply in the territorial sea as well. 4 2 The Second
Convention similarly has no limitation and applies to the high seas, the
territorial sea and in certain cases, internal waters. 43 The question
remains, however, whether and to what extent these rules would apply
to aircraft in the territorial sea.
The United States takes the view that its warships may enter
other States' territorial seas for saving those in danger at sea; U.S.
aircraft may enter with notice to the coastal state and its permission. 1"
This would seem to be the prudent rule, with notice given the coastal
state if practicable if a warship enters for rescue assistance. However,
in extreme, exigent circumstances, e.g., where life will be lost because
of stormy weather or sharks unless action is taken immediately, it
would seem that the state of necessity doctrine 145 would allow limited
entry for that purpose, with prompt reporting after the event.
II. JUS COGENS: A GHOST IN INTERNATIONAL LAW THAT
MAY PLAY A ROLE

Jus cogens has developed since World War II during the
Charter era as meaning those international law rules that are so
fundamental that they supersede contrary treaty or customary rules, and
to Assistance and Salvage at Sea, arts. 11, 14, Sept. 23, 1910, 37 Stat. 1658
(not applicable to warships), being replaced by International Convention on
Salvage, arts. 4, 10, Apr. 28, 1989, T.I.A.S. -, U.S. Treaty Doc. 102-12 (not
applicable to warships unless State party applies Convention to them);
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, Regs. 2, 10, ch. V, Nov.
1, 1974, 32 U.S.T. 47, 1184 U.N.T.S. 2; COLOMBOS, supra note 28, § 369;
Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,
3.2.1-3.2.1.2; Jennings & Watts, supra
note 4, § 298.
142 3 United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea 1982: A
Commentary
98.1, 98.11 (g) (Myron H. Nordquist ed.-in-chief, 1995).
143 Second Convention, supra note 10, arts. 12, 18; see also
id. art. 5
(neutrals must apply by analogy the provisions to wounded, sick, shipwrecked,
armed forces medical personnel, armed forces chaplains of parties to a conflict,
and the dead found at sea); Hague X, supra note 10, art. 16, superseded by
Second Convention, supra; 2 Oppenheim, supra note 74, §§ 204-05; 2 Jean S.
Pictet, Commentary 41-45, 86-90 (1960). Besides treaty and custom-based
law, commentators advocate applying humanitarian principles to armed conflict
at sea. See generally COLOMBOS, supra note 28, §§ 509-1I.
144 Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, T 2.3.2.5; see also supra notes
70-71 and accompanying text (general rule against military aircraft innocent
passage).
45 I.e., entry would be unlawful, but would avert a greater tragedy,
loss of human life. See supra notes 103-04 and accompanying text.
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perhaps general principles.146 The International Court of Justice,
limited to sources it can consider by its statute, 47 has never decided a
case on jus cogens grounds, although it has twice ruled that Charter
Article 2(4), requiring all Members to refrain from threats or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, "approaches" jus cogens status. It has also been argued that selfdefense under Charter Article 51 is entitled tojus cogens status.' 48 The
146

See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, pmbl., arts. 53, 64, 71. Jus

cogens has uncertain contours. See generally Brownlie, supra note 5, at 5, 51012, 626, 630, 666 (jus cogens' content uncertain); T.O. Elias, The Modem Law
of Treaties 177-87 (1974) (same); Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, §§ 2, 642,
653 (same); McNair, supra note 7, at 214-15 (same); RESTATEMENT, supra note
5, §§ 102 r.n. 6, 323 cmt. b, 331(2), 338(2) (same); Shabtai Rosenne,
Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945-1986, at 281-88 (1989); 1 SMIMA,
supra note 4, at 62 (dispute over self-determination as jus cogens); Sinclair,
supra note 13, at 17-18, 218-26 (Vienna Convention principles considered
progressive development in 1984); Tunkin, supra note 6, at 98; Levan
Alexidze, Legal Nature of Jus Cogens in ContemporaryLaw, 172 R.C.A.D.I.
219, 262-63 (1981); John N. Hazard, Soviet Tactics in International
Lawmaking, 7 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL. 9, 25-29 (1977); Jimenez de Arechaga,
International Law in the Last Third of a Century, 159 R.C.A.D.I. 9, 64-67
(1978); Dinah Shelton, Normative Heirarchy in InternationalLaw, 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 291 (2006); Mark Weisburd, The Emptiness of the Concept of Jus
Cogens, As Illustratedby the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L.
1 (1995). An International Law Commission study acknowledged primacy of
UN Charter art. 103-based law and jus cogens inebut declined to catalogue
what are jus cogens norms. International Law Commission, Report on Its
Fifty-Seventh Session (May 2-June 3 and July I l-August 5, 2005), UN GAOR,
60th Sess., Supp. No. 10, pp. 221-25, UN Doc. A/60/10 (2005) (2005 ILC
Rep.); see also Michael J. Matheson, The Fifty-Seventh Session of the
InternationalLaw Commission, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 416, 422 (2006).
147 I.C.J. Statute arts. 38(1), 59; see also supra note 5 and
accompanying text.
148 Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. 226,
245 (hereinafter Nuclear Weapons); Nicaragua Case, supra note 11, 1986 I.C.J.
at 100-01 (U.N. Charter art. 2[4] approaches jus cogens status); see also ILC
Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4, art. 50 & Commentary
1-5, in 2001 ILC Rep., supra note 4, at 247-49, reprinted in Crawford, supra
note 4, at 288-89 ("fundamental substantive obligations"); Jennings & Watts,
supra note 4, § 2 (Art. 2[4] a fundamental norm); RESTATEMENT, supra note 5,
§§ 102, cmts. h, k; 905(2) & cmt. g (same); CarinKaghan, Jus Cogens and the
Inherent Right Self-Defense, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 767, 823-27 (1997)
(U.N. Charter art. 51 represents jus cogens norm); 2001 ILC Rep., supra at
177-80, art. 21 & Commentary, reprinted in Crawford, supra at 166, resolving
the issue of conflict between UN Charter arts. 2(4) and 51 by saying that no art.
2(4) issues arise if there is a lawful self-defense claim, appears to give art. 51
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result is that we are left today with a spectrum of claims by
commentators that range from the very broad to a denial thatjus cogens
exists. Commentators declare that jus cogens does not play a major
role in LOS considerations. 49 That may change; jus cogens may have
a much more significant role where Charter-based law, the LOAC, or
human rights or humanitarian law issues are on the stage. In any event,
since the Vienna Convention recognizes the doctrine and declares rules
for applying it to treaties, 5 0 jus cogens, although perhaps spectral in
terms of content in the view of many, is a factor that must be
considered in port security issues in peace or war. 5 '
II1. THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT AND PORTS, INTERNAL
WATERS AND THE TERRITORIAL SEA
The law of naval warfare and neutrality at sea in international
armed conflicts 52 includes a patchwork of sometimes outmoded
the same status as art. 2(4); Armed Activities on Terr. of Congo (Dem. Rep. of
Congo v. Rwanda), 2006 I.C.J. 3, 29-30, 49-50 (jurisdiction, admissibility of
application) held ajus cogens violation allegation was not enough to deprive
the Court of jurisdiction, preliminarily stating that the Convention on
Prevention & Punishment of Crime of Genocide, T.I.A.S. No. -, 78 U.N.T.S.
277, represented erga omnes obligations. Vienna Convention, supra note 7,
art. 53 was among other treaties cited; see supra note 146 and accompanying
text. While also citing the Nicaragua and Nuclear Weapons Cases, supra,
Shelton, supra note 146, at 305-06, says Armed Activities, supra, is the first
I.C.J. case to recognizejus cogens, but its holding seems not quite the same as
ruling on an issue and applying jus cogens. The case compromise included
Vienna Convention, supra, which raisesjus cogens issues that the Court could
have decided under that law as well as more traditional sources. I.C.J. Statute
arts. 36, 38, 59.
149 Churchill & Lowe, supra note 5, at 6.
IS0 See supra Part II. The United States is not a Vienna Convention,
supra note 7, party. Unless rules for the law of treaties are customary law or
general principles accepted by the United States, the United States is not bound
by them. However, 109 countries, including many allies, coalition partners or
trading partners of the United States, are parties to the Vienna Convention,
supra. Multilateral Treaties, supra note 8. As references in this article
demonstrate, many but not all of the Convention rules are considered
customary law.
151 1 offer a factorial analysis for solving the problem. See generally
Walker, supra note 15.
152 Part III addresses the law of international armed conflicts. Law
applying to nonintemational armed conflicts (e.g., civil wars) is similar but can
differ in some respects. For example, Protocol I, supra note 25, applies to
international armed conflicts; its companion, Protocol Additional to the Geneva
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treaties that remain in effect;' 53 today the LOAC is more often
governed by custom and general principles, with a leavening of court
decisions and treatises or national operational manuals. This is
particularly true for air operations affecting the territorial sea, internal
waters and ports. An exception to this patchwork is the Second
Convention of 1949, which governs humanitarian law standards in
armed conflicts at sea, and which is specific in its content and very
much in force today as supplemented by 1977 Protocol 1. Part III
begins with examination of general standards, followed by rules in
treaties, customary law or general principles that apply to military
operations involving ports, internal waters around ports, and the
territorial sea around ports.
A.

THE "OTHER RULES" CLAUSES AND LAW OF TREATIES
STANDARDS

The 1958 and 1982 LOS conventions are replete with
declarations that their terms are subject to "other rules of international
law," or similar language. 54 The traditional view is that the phrases
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
609. Because of space limitations, this article does not analyze that body of
law, intertwined as it is with the law of international armed conflicts; principles
applying to civil wars and the like have become increasingly important.
153
Although the list of States officially parties to some early treaties,
see, e.g., supra note 9, is relatively small, the law of treaty succession may
enlarge the numbers considerably. Since their ratification colonial empires
have vanished, with former colonies achieving independent status; States like
Czechoslovakia, Russia and Yugoslavia have sundered apart. Germany is now
one State, however. Int'l L. Ass'n, Committee on Aspects of the Law of State
Succession, Report of the Seventy-Third Conference held at Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, August 17-20, 2008, Final Report at 250, 360-62 (2008) (hereinafter
Final Report) (general acceptance of U.N. succession conventions; recent
practice); see generally Symposium, State Succession in the Former Soviet
Union and in Eastern Europe, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 253 (1993); George K.
Walker, Integration and Disintegrationin Europe: Reordering the Treaty Map
of the Continent, 6 TRANSNAT'L L. 1 (1993). Although the ensuing discussion
concentrates on these treaties' terms, it must be borne in mind that many
customary rules or general principles may also bind States that may or not bind
them through treaties through succession principles, which as id. reveal, are
less than clear. See also supra notes 5, 169, 194, 199, 203 and accompanying
text.
154 UNCLOS, supra note 2, pmbl., arts. 2(3) (territorial sea); 19, 21, 31
(territorial sea innocent passage); 34(2) (straits transit passage); 52(1)
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mean the LOAC, although there is some indication that a broader
meaning may be developing. 155 If these conventions, or at least some
parts of them, represent customary law, 156 the result is that customary
law declares a similar rule, i.e., that in armed conflict situations,
different rules may apply. For example, the LOS conventions have
complex rules for the nationality of merchant ships; the LOAC rule
is
57
that merchant ships' nationality is determined by the flag they fly.1

(archipelagic sea lanes passage; incorporation by reference of Articles 19, 21,
31); 58(1), 58(3) (EEZ); 78 (continental shelf; coastal State rights do not affect
superjacent waters, i.e., territorial or high seas; coastal State cannot infringe or
unjustifiably interfere with "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other
States as provided in this Convention"); 87(1) (high seas); 138 (the Area); 293
(court or tribunal having jurisdiction for settling disputes must apply UNCLOS
and "other rules of international law" not incompatible with UNCLOS); 303(4)
(archeological, historical objects found at sea, "other international agreements
and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an
archeological and historical nature"); Annex Ill, Article 21(l); High Seas
Convention, supra note 8, art. 2; Territorial Sea Convention, supra note 2, arts.
1(2), 22(2). Although the Continental Shelf and Fishing Conventions, supra
note 8, do not have other rules clauses, these treaties declare that waters within
their competence are high seas areas. Continental Shelf Convention, supra art.
3; Fishing Convention, supra arts. 1-2. The same is true for the contiguous
zone next to the territorial sea; beyond the territorial sea, the contiguous zone is
a high seas area. UNCLOS, supra art. 33(1); Territorial Sea Convention,
supra art. 24(1). See also High Seas Convention, supra art. I, defining "high
seas" as all parts of the sea not included in a State's territorial sea or internal
waters.
155 Law of the Sea Committee, Report, in Proceedings of the American
Branch of the International Law Association 2007-2008, at 300-07 (2008)
(hereinafter Report).
156 High Seas Convention, supra note 8, pmbl. (treaty provisions
"generally declaratory of established principles of international law); President
Reagan, supra note 8 (UNCLOS, supra note 2 navigational articles are
customary law).
Commentators have agreed with the U.S. view.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, Part V, Introductory Note, at 3-5; Thomas &
Duncan, supra note 2,
1.1; John Norton Moore, Introduction, in I
Commentary, supra note 9, at xxvii; Bernard H. Oxman, InternationalLaw and
Naval and Air Operations at Sea, in The Law of Naval Operations, supra note
55, at 19, 29; but see Churchill & Lowe, supra note 5, at 24; 1 O'Connell,
supra note 28, at 48-49.
157 Compare UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts.
91, 94; High Seas
Convention, supra note 8, art. 5, with San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 1 1217&cmts.; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,
7.5, 12.3.1; see also Report,
supra note 155, at 234-36, 239-43.
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Law of treaties principles may apply to nullify or suspend
application of LOS convention rules during armed conflict:
of
change
fundamental
or
performance
of
impossibility
Human rights
circumstances,15 8 or armed conflict itself.159

158

Fundamental change under Vienna Convention, supra note 7, is

different from the rebus sic stantibus doctrine, which the Convention would
supersede. Force majeure or distress also might be claimed; it is an excuse for
nonperformance so long as circumstances giving rise to it exist, while
impossibility justifies terminating a treaty. The LOS conventions refer to force
majeure and distress. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts. 18(2) (territorial sea
innocent passage includes stopping, anchoring but only if necessary because of
force majeure or distress, or for helping persons, ships, aircraft in danger of
distress), 39(1)(c) (exception for straits transit passage, which otherwise
requires continuous, expeditious transit); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note
2, art. 14(3) (same as UNCLOS, supra art. 18[2]). Compare ILC Draft
Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4, arts. 23, 24, 25(2)(b), 2001 ILC
Rep., supra note 4, at 183, 189, 194, reprintedin Crawford, supra note 4, at
170, 174, 178, with Vienna Convention, supra arts. 61-62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at
346-47; see also Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 1997
I.C.J. 7, 39 (Arts. 61, 62 customary norms) (hereinafter Project Case); Fisheries
Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.C.J. 3, 18 (same for Art. 62); Aust, supra
note 13, at 239-42; Brownlie, supra note 5, at 623-25; Arie E. David, The
Strategy of Treaty Termination ch. 1 (1975); Elias, supra note 114, at 119-30;
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
657, 1096-1126 (Supp. 1935) (hereinafter Harvard Draft Convention) (rebus
sic stantibus); Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, §§ 650-51; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 5, § 336; Sinclair, supra note 13, at 190-96; International Law
Commission, Report on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, U.N. Doc.
A/6309/Rev. I (1966), reprintedin 2 (1966) Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 211, U.N.
Doc. A/CN.4/Ser.A/1966/Add. 1, at 169, 255-58 (hereinafter 1966 ILC Rep.);
Gyorgy Haraszti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of Circumstances, 146
R.C.A.D.I. 1 (1975); Robert D. Keamey & Robert E. Dalton, The Treaty on
Treaties, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 495 (1970); (Vienna Convention, supra drafting
negotiations); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61
AM. J. INT'L L. 895 (1967); Walker, supra note 153, at 65-68 (1993). McNair,
supra note 7, at 685 does not recognize a separate impossibility rule; some of
his examples are impossibility situations and might be cited as such. The
International Law Commission has begun analyzing the issue of the
relationship of armed conflict and treaties. 2005 ILC Rep., supra note 114, at
44-72; see also Matheson, The Fifty-Seventh, supra note 146, at 422-24.
159 5 Hackworth Digest of International Law § 513, at 383-84; Harvard
Draft Convention, supra note 158, art. 35(a), at 664; Institut de Droit
International, The Effects of Armed Conflicts on Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, arts.
3-4, 61(2) Annuaire 278, 280 (1986); id., Regulations Regarding the Effect of
War on Treaties, 1912, art. 5, reprinted in 7 AM. J. INT'L L. 153, 154 (1913);
Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, § 655; McNair, supra note 7, ch. 43;
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conventions' derogation clauses may circumscribe application of many
of those treaties' rules. 160 However, the Vienna Convention makes it
clear that a breach of a humanitarian law treaty does not excuse
performance by States; this echoes 1949 Geneva Convention
principles. 16 1 Moreover, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, i.e.,
treaties must be observed in good faith, 162 may be thrown in the balance
against claims of otherwise justified non-performance.
Some
international agreements may declare that they apply in peace and war.
Bilateral and multilateral treaties between the belligerent(s) and the
state(s) not party to a conflict remain in force as to the treaty
relationship, and they remain in force between States not party to a
conflict, 163 unless there are successful impossibility of performance or
fundamental change of circumstances claims.164

supra note 5, § 335, cmt. c; G.G. Fitzmaurice, The Judicial
Clauses of the Peace Treaties, 73 R.C.A.D.I. 255, 312 (1948); Cecil J.B. Hurst,
The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 42 (1921); see also
Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 60(5), supra note 13, infra note 161 and
accompanying text.
160 E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 4,
Dec. 6, 1966, T.I.A.S. No. -, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
161 Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 60(5); e.g., Second
Convention, supra note 10, art. 2; see also 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 26-31;
supra notes 13, 159 and accompanying text.
RESTATEMENT,

162

Vienna Convention, supra note 7, pmbl. ("...

pacta sunt servanda

rule [is] universally recognized"), art. 26; see also U.N. Charter pmbl.,
("respect for obligations arising from treaties"); Project Case, supra note 158,
1997 I.C.J. at 78-79 ("What is required in the present case by the rule pacta
sunt servanda, as reflected in Article 26 of the [Vienna Convention, supra] is
that the Parties find an agreed solution within the cooperative context of the
Treaty."); Aust, supra note 13, at 144-45, 187; Brownlie, supra note 5, at 620
(general principle of law); Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 158, art. 20,
at 977 (rule of law); 1966 ILC Rep., supra note 158, at 211 (pacta sunt
servanda a rule of law); Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, §§ 12, at 38, 584
(pacta sunt servanda a customary rule); Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law 21417 (Max Knight trans., 2d rev. ed. 1967) (pacta sunt servanda comes from
custom); McNair, supra note 7, at 465, 493; RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 321
& cmt. a (pacta sunt servanda at core of law of international agreements and is
"perhaps the most important principle of international law"); I SIMAA, supra
note 4, at 35-36, 92-93, 96-97; Sinclair, supra note 13, at 83-84, 119 (no
suggestion pacta sunt servanda a fundamental norm); Kearney & Dalton,
163 Institut de Droit International, The Effects, supra note 159, arts. 2,
3, 5, 11, at 280-82; id., Regulations, supra note 159, arts. 1, 4, 7-10, at 153-55;
Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Karnuth v. United States, 279 U.S.
231, 240-42 (1929); Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y. 1920), cert.
denied, 254 U.S. 643 (1920); Jennings & Watts, supra note 4, § 655, referring
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These law of treaties rules do not apply to parallel customary
norms or general principles, which are alternate sources of law coequal
with treaties. 165 However, given the LOS conventions' other rules
clauses and development of parallel custom to exclude LOS standards
in armed conflict situations, the customary law of naval warfare and
neutrality and general principles related to it, sails a separate course
from the LOS in LOAC situations. A major exception is humanitarian
law embodied in the Second Convention and similar treaties that may
also support customary norms.
Charter law may govern LOAC situations. Here the same
rules apply: supremacy of Security Council decisions over rules
grounded in treaties and perhaps customary law, and perhaps the
primacy of other resolutions of the Council and the General Assembly.
Self-defense responses against third States continue to have primacy
over treaty rules, e.g., belligerent state A conducting lawful operations
in an opposing belligerent B's territorial sea and an attack by state C.
Self-defense standards would apply to the A vs. C confrontation.
However, conditioning factors, i.e., due regard for LOAC standards,
may apply in all of these circumstances. 66 For example, a state
engaged in armed conflict with another country might establish defense
with the same rules applying to
zones or continue to operate its ADIZs,
167
them as in a peacetime situation.
B. RULES IN TREATIES AND CUSTOMARY LA WAPPLYING TO
PORTS, INTERNAL WATERS AND THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Treaties, augmented by customary law and general principles,
touch upon issues involving ports, internal waters and the territorial sea
during armed conflict.
to 2 Oppenheim, supra note 74, §§ 99(4)-99(5); see also George B. Davis, The
Effects of War Upon InternationalConventions and Private Contracts, 1927
AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 124-29; Fitzmaurice, The Judicial, supra note 159, at
307-17; Harvard Draft Convention, supra note 158, art. 35(b), at 664-65; Cecil
J.B. Hurst, The Effect of War on Treaties, 2 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 37, 40 (1921);
James J. Lenoir, The Effect of War on Bilateral Treaties, with Special
Reference to Reciprocal Inheritance Treaty Provisions,20 GEO. L.J. 129, 17377 (1946). Formerly when hostilities began belligerents would declare that all
treaties with opponents were thereupon terminated. Id. 146.
16' See supra note 158 and accompanying text.
165 I.C.J. Statute arts. 38(1), 59; RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, §§ 10203; see also supra note 5 and accompanying text.
166 See supra notes 3-51 and accompanying text.
167 See supra Part I.B.3.
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1. HUMANITARIAN LAW
Among the most important treaty provisions today are those
dealing with humanitarian law. The Second Convention, augmented by
169
1977 Protocol 1,168 has been in force for nearly every state for years.
The Convention, dealing with the wounded, sick and shipwrecked
members of armed forces at sea, applies only to forces aboard ship;
once forces put ashore they become subject to the First Convention,
which applies to care of these persons on land. 170 The Second
Convention's Articles 1-3 are the same as those of the other 1949
conventions. 171
Protections for the wounded, sick and shipwrecked include are
also available to those persons in aircraft forced down at sea or who
bail out of aircraft over the sea. 172 They, as well as personnel, ships or
168

The United States is not a Protocol 1,supra note 25, party but

recognizes many of its provisions as customary law. See supra note 34.
Protocol I, supra, arts. 48-67 declaring general protection against effects of
hostilities, do not apply to naval warfare at sea or in the air, but they do apply
to sea or air warfare that may affect the civilian population, individual civilians
or civilian objects on land and to attacks from the sea or the air against
objectives on the land. Id art. 49(3). Id.is in addition to rules for humanitarian
protection in the Fourth Convention, supra note 26, as well as other
international law rules relating to protection of civilians and civilian objects on
land, at sea or in the air against the effects of hostilities. Protocol 1, supra art.
49(4); see also id. arts. 68, 72, referring to Fourth Convention, supra; Bothe et
al., supra note 27 , at 291, 427-29, 440-45; Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 60508, 809-10, 841-44.
169 TIF, supra note 17, at 438-39 lists 198 parties, but the number is
subject to treaty succession principles. Final Report, supra note 153;
Symposium, supra note 153; Walker, supranote 153.
170 Second Convention, supra note 10, art.
4, referring to First
Convention, supra note 26; see also 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 39-41.
171
Compare Second Convention, supra note 10, art. I (respect for
Convention in all circumstances), 2 (applicability to declared war or "any other
armed conflict" and to conflicts with a Power not party to the Convention if
that Power accepts and applies its provisions), 3 (noninternational armed
conflicts, e.g., civil wars, minimum standards) with First Convention, Third
Convention, Fourth Convention, supra note 26, arts. 1-3; see also I Jean S.
Pictet, Commentary 24-61(1952); 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 24-38; 3 Jean S.
Pictet, Commentary 17-44 (1960); 4 Pictet, supra note 27, at 15-44.
172 Second Convention, supra note 10, arts.
5, 12-13; see also
Protocol 1,supra note 25, art. 10; 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 41-45, 84-104.
Protocol 1,supra art. 8(b) defines "shipwrecked," for purposes of the Protocol,
as "persons,... military or civilian, . . . in peril at sea or in other waters as a
result of misfortune affecting them or the vessel or aircraft carrying them and
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equipment protected by the Second Convention, cannot be the subject
of reprisals.1 73 There is a general obligation that those shipwrecked or
otherwise in peril on the sea must be rescued, if the rescuing platform
(ship, aircraft) can do so without endangering itself or its crew or
passengers. After each military engagement parties to a conflict must,
without delay, take all possible measures to search for and collect the
shipwrecked, wounded and sick, protect them against pillage and illtreatment, ensure their adequate care, and search for the dead,
preventing bodies from being despoiled. This requirement applies to
civilians, e.g., passengers, as well as military personnel. 174 Parties to a
conflict may appeal to masters of neutral merchant ships or other
vessels, including neutral-flagged ships owned or operated by neutral
governments, to take aboard and care for the wounded, shipwrecked or

who refrain from any act of hostility.. . [and if] they continue to refrain from
any act of hostility .... continue to be considered shipwrecked during their
rescue until they acquire another status under the Conventions or this Protocol."
Id. art. 8(a), for purposes of the Protocol, defines "wounded" and "sick" as
military or civilian persons "who, because of trauma, disease or other mental or
physical disorder or disability, are in need of medical assistance or care and
who refrain from any act of hostility[,]" including maternity cases, the newborn, or others needful of immediate medical assistance or care, e.g., the infirm
or expectant mothers, and who refrain from any act of hostility.
173
Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 47; see also First
Convention, supra note 26, art. 46 (same); Third Convention, supra note 26,
art. 13 (reprisals against prisoners of war forbidden); Fourth Convention, supra
note 26, art. 33 (reprisals against persons protected under Convention
forbidden); Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 20 (reprisals against medical
personnel, objects protected by id. arts. 8-34 barred), 51(6), 52(1) (reprisals
against civilians, civilian objects forbidden), 53(c) (reprisals against cultural
objects, places of worship), 54(4) (reprisals against objects indispensable to
survival of civilian population prohibited), 55(2) (reprisals against natural
environment barred), 56 (4) (reprisals against works, installations containing
dangerous forces prohibited); 1 Pictet, supra note 171, at 341-47 (reprisals
prohibition does not bar retorsions); 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 252-56 (same);
3 Pictet, supra note 171, at 139-42; 4 Pictet, supra note 27, at 224-29 (reprisals
prohibition does not bar retorsions); infra notes 241-44 and accompanying text.
174
This is a general obligation in peace or war. Second Convention,
supra note 10, arts. 5, 12, 18; see also supra notes 109-12 and accompanying
text. Burial at sea, carried out individually as far as circumstances permit, must
be preceded by careful examination, if possible by a medical examination, to
confirm death and establish identity so that a report can be made to proper
authorities. If bodies are landed, First Convention, supra note 26 rules for
disposing of remains apply. Second Convention, supra art. 20. See also
Protocol I, supra note 25, arts. 32-34 (additional rules for the missing, dead); 2
Pictet, supra note 143, at 41-45, 84-92, 129-36, 146-50.
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sick, and to collect the dead. Ships responding to these calls, and those
acting of their own accord, "shall enjoy special protection and facilities
to carry out such assistance."
These vessels may not be captured
because they are transporting these persons or the dead, but absent a
promise to the contrary, remain liable to capture for any violations of
neutrality they commit. 175 A belligerent's warships may demand that
hospital ships and merchant vessels surrender the wounded, sick or
shipwrecked that are aboard them if the warship has adequate care
76
facilities available, and the wounded are in a condition to be moved.
If a neutral-flagged warship or military aircraft takes aboard a
belligerent's wounded, sick or shipwrecked, "it shall be ensured, where
so required by international law, that [these persons] can take no further
part in operations of war."' 1 77 A belligerent's wounded, sick and
shipwrecked who fall into enemy hands are prisoners of war. The
captor may decide to hold them, convey them to a port in the captor's
state, convey them to a neutral port, or to a port in enemy territory. In
the last case prisoners of war returned to their home state may not serve
for the war's duration. Neutral powers must guard the wounded, sick
or shipwrecked landed in their ports with local authority consent so that
they do not again take part in operations of war.' 78 If the wounded,
sick and shipwrecked prisoners of war are aboard a warship disarmed
in a neutral port, the warship crew must be interned, but the former
prisoners of war must be set free. 1 79 If the shipwrecked, wounded and
sick arrive aboard a neutral warship, they must be interned.'80 If they
arrive aboard a neutral merchantman, they must be set at liberty.' 8' If
they come ashore on their own in, e.g., a lifeboat or after escaping, they

175 Second Convention, supra note

10, art. 21; see also 2 Pictet, supra

note 143, at 150-52.

176 Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 14; see also 2 Pictet, supra
note 143, at 104-07.
177 Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 15; see also 2 Pictet,
supra
note 143, at 107-12.
178 Second Convention, supra note 10, arts. 16-17; see also
Third
Convention, supra note 26; 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 117-29.
179 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 120, citing Hague XIII, supra
note 10,
art. 24; but see 2 Oppenheim, supra note 74, §§ 345, 348a (disputing freedom
for former prisoners of war).
180
Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 15; see also 2 Pictet, supra

note 143, at 120.
181

2 Pictet, supra note 143,

Convention, supra note 10, art. 15.

at 120, commenting on Second
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are also entitled to not being interned. 182 With one exception, practice
during the World Wars has displaced Hague XI rules for merchant ship
crews. 183

Although the foregoing provisions often do not recite rules for
ports, internal waters or the territorial sea, their effect on these areas is
obvious, whether these areas are in enemy or neutral hands. Sooner or
later these persons will likely be landed, and to be landed, perhaps in a
port where there are nearby care facilities, whether by boat or by
aircraft, they must traverse the territorial sea and perhaps internal
waters.
The Second Convention has rules for hospital ships, including
those under private ownership, coastal rescue craft and shore
establishments established under the First Convention for treating the
wounded and sick. They may not be attacked, unless after they have
been first warned they have lost their protections by committing acts
harmful to the enemy. Several other provisions deserve comment.
state-operated coastal rescue craft and their fixed coastal installations
must be protected insofar as operational requirements permit. Hospital
ships in ports falling to the enemy must be authorized to leave the port.
These vessels operate in areas of military operations at their own risk.
Hospital ships as described in the Convention are not warships with
respect to how long they may remain in port. They may arm their
crews or sickbays to maintain order, for personal self-defense (e.g.,
personal side arms), or to defend the wounded and sick. Hospital
ships' religious personnel, medical personnel, and crews in the service

182 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 120.

A case can be made for

internment, however, by analogy to enemy aviators who land their warplanes
on neutral territory.
183 I.A. Shearer, Commentary, in Natalino Ronzitti, The Law of Naval

Warfare: A Collection of Agreements and Documents with Commentaries 183,
187-88 (1988), noting that Hague Xl, supra note 10, art. 5 has been confirmed
by Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 4(A)(5), declaring that seafarers

aboard enemy merchantmen may be detained and made prisoners of war, but
that practice has changed the art. 5 rule, which says that crew who are nationals

of a neutral State aboard an enemy-flagged merchant ship cannot be made
prisoners of war, and that the master and officers are entitled to this status if
they give parole not to serve on an enemy ship during the war. Id. art. 6
would apply the parole standard to officers and crew of an enemy merchantman
who are enemy nationals. Id. art. 8 says that arts. 5-7 principles do not apply
to ships taking part in hostilities. Id. does not cover the situation of enemy
crews aboard neutral merchantmen; World War II customary practice declared
them prisoners of war.
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of the ship, may not be captured and must be respected. 184 Although
the Convention recites general rules for hospital ships and shore
establishments, it is obvious that these ships, if they are not already in
territorial or internal waters or a port, may head for a port through the
territorial sea and/or internal waters. These principles would then come
into play for the LOS areas in this analysis.185 It is likely that First
Convention-covered shore establishments may be in ports.
Medical aircraft, i.e., those used exclusively for removing
wounded, sick and shipwrecked and to transport medical personnel and
equipment, may not be attacked and must be respected by parties to a
conflict while these planes fly at heights, at times and on routes agreed
to by the parties. These flights cannot go over enemy or enemyoccupied territory. Medical aircraft must obey summonses to land on
land or water. After examination, the aircraft and its occupants may
continue the flight. If a medical aircraft lands involuntarily on land or
water in enemy or enemy-occupied territory, the wounded, sick and
shipwrecked, and the aircraft crew become prisoners of war. Medical
personnel must be treated like other medical personnel under the
Convention. 186 Medical aircraft may fly over neutral territory, land
184

First Convention, supra note 26, art.

20; Second Convention,

supra note 10, arts. 22-37. Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 22 adds that Second
Convention provisions also apply if hospital ships carry shipwrecked, wounded
or sick civilians. Protocol I, supra art. 23, says that medical ships and craft
other than those referred to in id. art. 22 must be respected and protected in the
same way as mobile medical units under the 1949 Conventions and Protocol I.
See also Bothe et al., supra note 27, at 143-45; Helsinki Principles, supra note
72, Principle 5.1.1 & cmt. (hospital ships in belligerent ports); I Pictet, supra
note 171, at 199-200; 2 Pictet, supra note 143, ch. 3; San Remo Manual, supra
note 27, 47(a), 48-51 & cmts; Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 253-78. By
contrast, unless there are issues of seaworthiness, Hague XIII, supra note 10,
art. 14 limits warship stays in neutral ports to 24 hours. See infra notes 222-24
and accompanying text. Protocol I, supra arts. 8(c)-8(g), 8( I)-8(j) define, for
purposes of the Protocol, "medical personnel," "religious personnel," "medical
units," '"medical transportation," "medical transports," "medical ships and
craft," and "medical aircraft." See also Bothe et al., supra at 97-101; 2
O'Connell, supra note 28, at 1119-22; San Remo Manual, supra
13(e),
13(f); Sandoz et al., supra at 124-32.
185 A hospital ship is protected even if it is in a port where there are
military objectives. 2 Pictet, supra note 143, at 157.
186 Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 39, referring to id. arts.
36-37; see also Protocol I, supra note 25, arts. 24-30 (additional rules for
medical aircraft agreements, operations, notifications, landing and inspections);
Third Convention, supra note 26; Bothe et al., supra note 27, at 149-63; 2
Pictet, supra note 143, at 215-22; San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 53(a);
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there if necessary, or use that territory as a port of call. Neutral States
must be notified of projected passage. These aircraft are immune from
attack while they fly on routes and at heights and times specifically
agreement among belligerents and the neutral state. Neutrals may
condition or restrict passage or landing of these aircraft on their
territory; conditions or restrictions must apply equally to all warring
States. If the wounded, sick or shipwrecked are disembarked with
neutral local authorities' consent on neutral territory, they must be
detained by the neutral where international law requires it so that they
cannot further take part in operations of war. The Power upon whom
they depend must bear the cost of their accommodation and
internment.1 87 The medical aircraft rules do not declare their specific
applicability to the territorial sea, internal waters or ports, but as in the
case of hospital ships, it is obvious that these rules apply to these areas,
particularly since treatment of the wounded may depend on getting
them to the nearest medical facility ashore, i.e., in a port.
Medical transports, i.e., vessels chartered to carry equipment
exclusively intended for treating the wounded and sick or to prevent
disease, are subject to cartel arrangements for sailing, provided the
adverse Power is notified of, and approves, their voyage. The adverse
Power has the right to board these carriers but cannot capture them or
seize the equipment. Parties may agree to place neutral observers
aboard transports to verify equipment carried. 188 Belligerents cannot

89
As in
deprive opponents of humanitarian relief supplies sent by sea.'
the case of hospital ships and medical aircraft, the territorial sea, inland

Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 279-324; supra note 152 and accompanying
text.
187 Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 40; see also Protocol I,
supra note 25, art. 31 (additional rules for flights over territory of neutral States
or States not party to a conflict); Bothe et al., supra note 27, at 163-67; 2 Pictet,
supra note 143, at 120, 222-25; Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 339-42.
188 Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 38. Protocol I, supra note
25, art. 23, says that medical ships and craft other than those referred to in id.
art. 22 and in Second Convention, supra art. 38 must be respected and
protected in the same way as mobile medical units under the 1949 Conventions
and Protocol I. See also Bothe et al., supra note 27, at 146-49; 2 Pictet, supra
47(b), 48 & cmts.;
note 143, at 212-15; San Remo Manual, supra note 27,
Sandoz et al., supra note 27, at 261-82.
189 Fourth Convention, supra note 26, arts. 23, 59; Protocol I, supra
note 25, arts. 54, 69-70; Bothe et al., supra note 27, at 334-42, 429-37; Helsinki
Principles, supra note 72, Principle 5.3 & cmt.; San Remo Manual, supra note
27, 47(c)(ii), 48 & cmts. (vessels exempt from attack if they do not lose
immunity by acting contrary to their normal role); Sandoz et al., supra note 27,
at 651-59, 809-29; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 8.4.1.2.
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waters or ports and their facilities may play a role in observance of
these rules.
As noted above, once persons entitled to Second Convention
protections are ashore in port or on land, rules applying to the wounded
and sick on land, 190 protections for prisoners of war,19' or for
civilians, 192 depending on these persons' status, apply to them.
2. TREATIES GOVERNING WAR AT SEA AND NEUTRALITY
International agreements governing maritime neutrality and
methods and means of warfare have implications for the territorial sea,
ports and inland waters. Many of these have become obsolescent with
respect to their specific rules and have been supplemented by
customary law and general principles.
The earliest general agreement on rules for war at sea, the
Declaration Respecting Maritime Law (1856), abolished privateering,
provided that a neutral flag covers enemy goods except contraband,
which is liable to capture, and that blockades must be effective, i.e.,
maintained by a force sufficient to prevent access to an enemy's
coast. 193
Its principles are now considered customary law.
Privateering, the commissioning of merchantmen to attack enemy
shipping carrying contraband, is now obsolete.' 94 What is contraband
continues to be debated, but the principle of neutral flags covering

190

First Convention, supra note 26; see also supra notes 140-53 and

accompanying text.
191

Third Convention, supra note 26; see also supra notes 140-53 and

accompanying text.
192

Fourth Convention, supra note 26; see also supra notes 140-53 and

accompanying text.
193 Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, supra note 10.
194 Although U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 11 empowers Congress to issue
letters of marque and reprisal, the United States, then and now is almost alone
among maritime States that is not a party, declared it would abide by the
privateering prohibition of Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, supra note
10, during the Civil War and the 1898 Spain-U.S. War. Introductory Note,
SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 27, at 1055; Hisakazu Fujita, Commentary, in
Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 66, 68, 70; see also COLOMBOS, supra note 28, §§
500, 536-38; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at 1102-03. No State has acceded to
the Declaration since 1909, but treaty succession principles and acceptance of
the Declaration as custom binds much of the world. See generally FinalReport,
supra note 153; Symposium, supra note 153; Walker, supra note 153. U.S.
legislation criminalizes certain acts of privateering. 18 U.S.C. § 1654 (2006).

2009]

SELF-DEFENSE, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
AND PORT SECURITY

399

enemy goods except contraband continues as a customary rule. 195 The
rule of effective blockade remains a customary norm. 19 6 Blockades
passage of relief supplies consigned for humanitarian
cannot prevent
197
purposes.

The 1907 Hague Conventions may be effective within their
98
would seem to limit their
scope. Although their inter se clauses'
99
principles apply,
succession
usefulness as treaty law today, if treaty
or a treaty rule has evolved into or codifies custom or a general
principle of law, they remain significant.

Hague VI declares that if a merchant ship registered under an
enemy flag is in an adversary's port at the beginning of hostilities, that
ship should be allowed to depart immediately or after a reasonable time
and to proceed directly to its destination. Those ships in an enemy port
and unable to depart because of force majeure may not be confiscated;

195 Fujita, supra note 162, at 68-69, 71-72; see also Helsinki
Principles, supra note 72, Principles 5.2.2-5.2.5 & cmts., inter alia makes the
important point that goods with a neutral destination coming from a
belligerent's port do not constitute contraband. These goods may be seized,
however, if they contribute to the enemy's warfighting or war-sustaining effort.
San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 60(g) & cmts.; Thomas & Duncan, supra
note 2, 18.1.1, 8.2.2.
196 What is an effective blockade, i.e., a blockade other than a paper
blockade, remains an issue. Fujita, supra note 162, at 69, 72-73. Most
blockade rules are in customary law. U.N. Charter art. 42 authorizes blockade
by U.N. Security Council resolution; see also CoLOMBOS, supra note 28, §§
503-05, 760-93, 714-844; Goodrich et al., supra note 4, at 314-17; 1 SIMMA,
supra note 4, at 749-59; Naval Conference of London, Declaration Concerning
the Laws of Naval War, Feb. 26, 1909, arts. 1-21 (hereinafter London
Declaration), reprinted in SCHINDLER & ToMAN, supra note 27, at 1143, 111315 and never ratified as a treaty; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at 1115, 1142-47,
93-104; Helsinki Principles,
1150-58; San Remo Manual, supra note 27
supra note 72, Principle 5.2. 10; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 7.7 recites
blockade rules. See also Introductory Note, in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra at
S111 (London Declaration was never ratified but its rules are recognized in
practice); Frits Kalshoven, Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 257,
259-62, 274.
197 Helsinki Principles, supra note 72, Principle 5.3 & cmt., citing
Fourth Convention, supra note 26, art. 61; Protocol I, supra note 25, arts. 69,
70. See also supra note 189 and accompanying text.
198 Hague VI, supra note 10, art. 6; Hague VII, supra note 10, art. 7;
Hague VIII, supra note 10, art. 7; Hague IX, supra note 10, art. 8; Hague XI,
supra note 10, art. 9; Hague XIII, supra note 10, art. 28.
199 See generally Final Report, supra note 153; Symposium, supra
note 153; Walker, supra note 153.
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they may only be detained with no obligation to pay for detention, and
must be restored to owners at the end of the war. Enemy cargo aboard
these ships is subject to the same rules, except that it may be
requisitioned on payment of compensation. Enemy merchantmen on
the high seas that touch port are subject to the law of naval warfare.
Because major maritime States did not ratify the Convention or later
denounced it, Hague VI has little impact today °0 and may be in
desuetude, 20 ' although conceivably its terms, on paper, could affect the
LOAC governing ports.
States continue to ratify Hague VII, which declares rules for
converting merchant ships into warships. 20 2 Hague VII's provisions
defining a warship carry over into the LOS conventions, albeit in
slightly different language. 2 3 The treaty does not discuss ports as such,
but there are obvious implications for a port where a conversion takes
place, i.e., a possibility of attack on that shipyard during armed conflict.
Hague VIII, stating rules for laying automatic submarine
contact mines, is a good example of technological obsolescence.
Although these kinds of mines may still be used, and the Hague rules
continue to apply to them as treaty and customary law, Hague VIII was
one of the least successful of the 1907 agreements and only
questionably applies to new generations of naval mines, e.g., mines that

These rules do not apply to merchant ships whose build shows they
are intended for conversion into warships. Hague VI, supra note 10, arts. 1-5.
The Convention, not in force for the United States and some maritime powers
and denounced by others, is insignificant today, except for its rules declaring
that some merchant ships and cargoes have a different status in the law of naval
warfare. COLOMBOS, supra note 28, §§ 676-80; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at
1103; Andrea de Guttry, Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 102, 10809.
201
San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 136 cmt. 136.2.
202
Hague VII, supra note 9; see also COLOMBOS, supra note 28, §§
539-57; Gabriella Venturini, Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 12026.
203
Compare Hague VII, supra note 10, arts. 2-3 with UNCLOS,
supra note 2, art. 29; High Seas Convention, supra note 8, art. 8(2); see also
supra notes 35, 49 and accompanying text. Treaty succession principles may
make Hague VII, supra applicable to more States. See generally FinalReport,
supra note 153; Symposium, supra note 153; Walker, supra note 153. The
similar warship definitions in the LOS conventions and Hague VII strongly
suggests that it is a universal customary rule. See supra notes 39, 68 and
accompanying text.
200
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lie on the sea bottom and rise to hit a target.2 °4 One provision,
forbidding laying anchored automatic contact mines off an enemy coast
and ports with the sole object of intercepting commercial shipping, has
become a customary rule applying to all kinds of mines.20 5 Another is
206is
the requirement to notify States of danger zones.
A third is a
minelaying state's duty to remove its mines at war's end.20 7 (The San
Remo Manual and the Helsinki Principles add that a neutral may
remove illegally laid mines. 20 1)
Hague IX's rule, forbidding bombardment by naval forces of
undefended ports, towns, villages, dwellings and buildings, or because
automatic submarine contact mines are anchored off the harbor, was
ignored in World Wars I and I and is probably obsolete today. 20 9 A
commentator suggests use of Protocol I's military objective standard as
a more appropriate general principle, 210 also noting that Hague IX,
204

Howard S. Levie, Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 140,

146, discussing Hague VIII, supra note 10; see also COLOMBOS, supra note 28,

§ 566; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at 1103, 1138-39; San Remo Manual, supra
note 27, at 168-69; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 1 9.2.1.
205
Neutral States laying automatic contact mines must observe the
same rules and take the same precautions, e.g., notifying States of where mines
have been laid. Hague VIII, supra note 10, arts. 2, 4; Levie, supra note 204, at
143-44. San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 1 85-89 and Thomas & Duncan,
supra note 2, 1 9.2.3, at 444-47 recite much more detailed rules to assure
passage and to deny belligerents a right to mine neutral waters. COLOMBOS,
supra note 28, § 563 comments that this provision seems useless; no belligerent
will likely admit laying mines solely to destroy enemy merchantmen and not
enemy warships.
206
Neutrals have the same duty. Hague VIII, supra note 10, arts. 2, 3;
Levie, supra note 204, at 143-44; see also San Remo Manual, supra note 27,
83 & cmts.; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 1 9.2.3, at 443.
207
Hague VIII, supra note 10, art. 5; Levie, supra note 204, at 14445, says that this was the basis for mine clearance after World Wars I and 11
and the Vietnam War, noting Agreement Relative to the Postwar Mine
Clearance in European Waters, Nov. 22, 1945, 3 Bevans 1322. See also San
Remo Manual, supra note 27, 1 84, 90-91 & cmts.; Thomas & Duncan, supra
note 2, 9.2.3, at 444 & n.29.
208
San Remo Manual, supra note 27, T 92 & cmt.; Helsinki Principles,
supra note 72, Principle 6.2 & cmt.
209
2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at 1139; Horace B. Robertson, Jr.,
Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 161, 163-66, on Hague IX, supra
note 10, art. 1, inter alia citing COLOMBOS, supra note 28, § 587. See also id.
§§ 580-87.
210 Robertson, Commentary, supra note 209, at 164-65, referring to
Protocol I, supra note 25, art. 52(2); see also Robertson, The Principle,supra
note 28; supra note 28 and accompanying text. Except its bar on reprisals on
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Articles 2 and 5 seem to sub silentio adopt the military objective
principle in listing what are valid targets.2 1 Other provisions appear
largely irrelevant to modem naval warfare; the need for a separate
modem treaty has been questioned. 1 2
Hague XI places limits on seizing postal correspondence,
except in cases of blockade; vessels used exclusively for coastal fishing
or local trade, which are not subject to capture unless they take part in
hostilities; and vessels on religious, scientific or philanthropic missions,
which are not subject to capture unless they take part in hostilities. 13
These standards for coasters have implications for the territorial sea
and, by extension, internal waters and ports. The mail ship prohibition
has little relevance today, since most correspondence goes by air or
other means, e.g., telex or e-mail. The rule against seizing coastal
fishing or trading vessels unless they aid the enemy remains highly
relevant and is a customary rule. The exemption for ships on scientific,
religious or philanthropic missions is also a customary rule and is
relevant today, particularly if some terrorists may use these vessels as
masks for their operations.214

civilians, Protocol I, supra art. 52 represents customary law. See supra note 28
and accompanying text.
211 Robertson, Commentary, supra note 209, at 166-67, discussing
Hague IX, supra note 10, arts. 2, 6, and citing Protocol 1,supra note 25, art.
52(2) and Hague Air Rules, supra note 27, art. 24, in SCHINDLER & ToMAN,
supra note 27, at 319.
212 Robertson, Commentary, supra note 209, at 166-68, 170, referring
to Hague IX, supra note 10, arts. 5-8.
213 Hague XI, supra note 10, arts. 1-4. UNCLOS, supra note 2, arts.
21(1)(g), 40, 87(1), 143, 238-65, 275, 277, 297 lays down comprehensive
marine scientific research (MSR) standards; among these is the rule that coastal
States may regulate MSR in the territorial sea. See also Report, supra note
155, at 273-77, defining MSR. These UNCLOS provisions, like the rest of the
LOS Conventions, are subject to the LOAC, self-defense principles, and
mandatory Charter law. See supranotes 3-51 and accompanying text.
214 Shearer, supra note 183, at 183-87, 189-90. See also COLOMBOS,
supra note 28, §§ 656-59, 662-63, 665-73; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at
47(f), 47(g), 48 & cmts.;
1122-24; San Remo Manual, supra note 27,
8.2.3 at 417, 8.3.2, 8.4.1; The Pacquete
Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); supra note 212 and accompanying text for
analysis of Hague XI, supra note 10, arts. 5-8. Fishing and scientific mission
vessels are also exempt from attack unless they violate conditions of their
immunity. San Remo Manual, supra 136(e), 136(f), 137 & cmts., notes that
the Hague XI, supra mail ship exclusion never became a customary norm.
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So long as they do not depart from their normal role, e.g., by
committing a hostile act, other vessels not listed in Hague XI that have
or may have immunity from capture or attack include: cartel vessels;215
ships transporting cultural property; 216 passenger ships when engaged
only in carrying civilian passengers; 217 vessels designed or adapted
exclusively for responding to maritime environmental pollution
220
incidents; 218 vessels that have surrendered;

219

life rafts and lifeboats.

Besides medical aircraft, aircraft granted safe conduct by
agreement between parties to a conflict, and civil airliners, if innocently
employed in their agreed or normal (in the case of airliners) roles and
do not intentionally hamper combatants' movements, are exempt from
attack unless, inter alia, circumstances of noncompliance with the rules
indicate the aircraft has become a military objective.22'

215

San Remo Manual, supra note 27,

47(c)(ii), 48, 136(c)(I), 137 &

cmts., inter alia citing Third Convention, supra note 26, art. 118, noting that
cartel ships are a traditional means for exchanging prisoners of war or official
communications between States. They have also been used to return an
enemy's embassy staff at war's outbreak. They are immune from attack if they
do not violate terms of the agreement or otherwise commit hostile acts. see
also CoLoMBos, supra note 28, §§ 660-61; 2 O'Connell, supra note 28, at
1123; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,
8.2.3 at 413, 8.3.2, 8.4.1.
216 San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 77 47(d), 48, 136(d), 137 &
cmts., referring to Cultural Property Convention, supra note 33, art. 12(3);
quaere whether this exemption is mandatory or discretionary for countries like
the United States that have not ratified the Convention. As a policy, as
distinguished from a rule of law, it seems wise to exempt these ships if they do
not contribute to the enemy war effort. Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, does
not list them as exempt from attack.
217 San Remo Manual, supra note 27, IT 47(e), 48 & cmts.; see also
Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 7 8.2.3 at 418, 8.3.2, 8.4.1. San Remo
Manual, supra
140 would prohibit destruction of liners carrying only
civilians; they should be diverted to an appropriate area or port to complete
capture.
218
San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 7 47(h), 48, 136(g) & cmts.,
suggesting that this exemption is progressive development and not customary
law.
219 Id. 77 47(l), 48 & cmts.; see also Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2,
8.2.1, listing methods to signal surrender.
220 San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 7 47(j), 48 & cmts. (customary
law), inter alia citing Second Convention, supra note 10, arts. 12, 18; Protocol
I, supra note 25, art. 8(b); see also supra notes 109-12, 174 and accompanying
text.
221 Cartel aircraft must also comply with the details of the agreement,
including availability for inspection. San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 77
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These lists of vessels and aircraft immune from capture, and in
some cases attack (e.g., liners carrying only civilians), might be
considered as subjects for open ocean warfare; however, all of them
could be subject to capture or attack in the territorial sea. To give one
horrific example that helped push the United States into World War I,
the Lusitania today lies, at least in part, on the bottom in Ireland's
territorial sea.
Hague XIII, reciting neutral States' rights and duties during
naval warfare, continues to be relevant today for ports, internal waters
and the territorial sea. Belligerents must respect neutrals' rights and to
abstain from acts in neutral territory or waters that would be a violation
of neutrality. Acts of hostility, including belligerents' search and
capture in neutral territorial waters, are violations of neutrality. A
neutral state, if it has the means to do so, must try to release a prize
captured by a belligerent. If the neutral cannot do so, the captor must
release the prize with its officers and crew.222 Although a neutral is not
bound to prevent export or transit of war goods, it must not supply a
belligerent or allow, within means at its disposal, outfitting or arming a
ship that it has reason to believe is intended to operate against a state
with which the neutral is at peace. It must also prevent, within means
at its disposal, departure of such a ship if that vessel has been adapted
for war within its jurisdiction. 2 23 A neutral must impartially apply its
prohibitions on port, roadstead or territorial sea entry by belligerent
warships or their prizes. If a belligerent ship fails to obey the rules, it
may be barred from entry. 224 Enemy warship or enemy prize passage
through a neutral's territorial sea, or belligerents' employing neutral
state pilots, do not affect a coastal state's neutral status.225 Warships

53(b), 53(c), 55-56, 62-64 & cmts.; Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 1 8.2.3
at 413, 417, 418, 8.3.2, 8.4.1.
222 Belligerents may not establish prize courts on neutral territory or
aboard ships in neutral waters. Hague XIII, supra note 10, arts. 1-4; see also
Helsinki Principles, supra note 72, Principle 1.4 & cmt.; San Remo Manual,
supra note 27, TT 14 (neutral waters definition), 15 (belligerents' hostile actions
forbidden in neutral waters), 17 (belligerents may not use neutral waters as
sanctuary), 18 (belligerent entry into neutral airspace forbidden). If a coastal
State allows or tolerates use of its waters or airspace above them for belligerent
purposes, the other belligerent may act to take necessary and appropriate action
to end such use. Helsinki Principles, supra, Principle 2.1 & cmt.; San Remo
Manual, supra T 22.
223
Hague XIII, supra note 10, arts. 5-8.
224 Id. arts. 9-10.
225 Id. arts. 10-11; see also San Remo Manual, supra note 27, 1 19,
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cannot remain in a neutral port or roadstead longer than 24 hours,
unless the vessel must make essential repairs or there is bad weather.
These warships cannot use neutral ports, roadsteads or territorial waters
to replenish or increase war supplies, or to augment their crews. They
may take aboard food supplies, up to the peacetime standard, and only
enough fuel to get home. The maximum number of warships in a
neutral port is three unless there are special provisions to the contrary.
If there are warships of both belligerents in port at the same time,
which might be the case at outbreak of an armed conflict, 24 hours
must elapse between departure of warships of different nationality. If a
belligerent warship does not leave the neutral's port when it is not
entitled to remain, the neutral state must take measures to bar the ship's
departure and intern its officers and crew.226 A neutral's exercising
rights under Hague XIII cannot be considered an unfriendly act by a
belligerent.227 (The Helsinki Principlesmake the important points, not
directly stated in Hague XIII, that neutral ships in belligerent ports have
the same protections as civilian objects in land warfare, neutral
warships in belligerent ports retain their right of self-defense, and that
neutral ships have the right of innocent passage through a belligerent's
territorial sea, subject to the belligerent's right to impose reasonable
defense requirements. 228 ) With some exceptions, e.g., the impact of
UNCLOS and questions on belligerent warship "passage" through
neutral territorial waters, Hague XIII's rules have largely become
customary law, although the treaty covers only a small part of

226

These warships cannot refuel in that neutral State's port during the

next three months. Prizes, convoyed by a warship or sailing independently,
may be admitted to neutral ports pending a prize court decision. A crew of a
convoyed prize may go aboard its accompanying warship. If the prize is not
convoyed, the prize crew is "left at liberty." Neutrals must exercise such
surveillance as it has at its disposal to prevent violations of the treaty. Hague
XIII, supra note 10, arts. 12-25; see also San Remo Manual, supra note 27,
20, 21. A neutral may impartially suspend innocent passage if it is essential to
protect its security. Helsinki Principles, supra note 72, Principle 2.3 & cmt,
inter alia citing UNCLOS, supra note 2, art. 25(3); San Remo Manual, supra
19; see also Helsinki Principles, supra, Principle 2.2 & cmt.; supra notes 2, 6872, 73-75, 86-87, 136-40, 154, 158 and accompanying text.
227 Hague XIII, supra note 10, art. 26.
228 Neutrals may convoy neutral vessels through other neutral
countries' waters in accordance with innocent passage rules or with the coastal
State's approval. Cf. Helsinki Principles, supra note 72, Principles 5.1.1, 5.28,
5.29, 6.1 & cmts.
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neutrality law in naval warfare. Most of its rules have not been applied
since World War

11.229

Since 1907 no general international agreements have laid
down LOAC rules that specifically affect ports, internal waters or the
territorial sea. There are two regional treaties that recite LOAC rules
related to these areas: the 1928 Havana Convention on Maritime
Neutrality and the 1938 Stockholm Declaration Regarding Similar
Rules of Neutrality, 230 both of which echo Hague XIII rules and thereby
strengthen them.2 3 ' As analyses of the 1856 Declaration and Hague
Conventions demonstrate, most rules have developed as customary law
or as general principles of law, repeated and sometimes
included in
2 33
232
or NGO publications.
national military manuals
C. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OFNA VAL WARFARE
AND NEUTRALITY

If no specific rules apply to a naval warfare or neutrality
situation, there are general principles of warfare governing military
operations, whether on land, sea or in the air. Attacks must be carried
229

Dietrich Schindler, Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at

211-21; see also COLOMBOS, supra note 28, §§ 722, 725-44.
230

Declaration for the Purpose of Establishing Similar Rules of

Neutrality, May 27, 1938, 188 L.N.T.S. 294; Convention on Maritime
Neutrality, supra note 10.
231
Ove Bring, Commentary, in Ronzitti, supra note 183, at 839, 843;
L.D.M. Nelson, Commentary, in id. 779, 783.
232 E.g., Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, the text of which is on the
bridge of every U.S. warship and aboard many other States' warships. Michael
N. Schmitt, Preface, in The Law of Military Operations, supra note 28, at xi.
Dieter Fleck et al., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts
555-63 (1999) lists humanitarian law handbooks published by States. Some of
these sources may publish more than humanitarian law rules; all are subject to
revision and updating. Two cases in point are Thomas & Duncan, supra, the
annotated version of the U.S. Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval
Operations, supra note 2, and UK Ministry of Defence, The Manual of the Law
of Armed Conflict (2004), which replace the sources Fleck et al., supra cite.
On-line sources, e.g., the U.S. Naval War College website for the
Commander's Handbook, should be researched for amendments and newer
editions. Fleck et al., supra publishes the 1992 German Joint Service
Regulations (Zdv) 15/2 in bold type. Dieter Fleck, Introduction, in id. xi, xii.
233 Chief among these are the Helsinki Principles, supra note 72,
published by the International Law Association; the San Remo Manual, supra
note 27, sponsored by the International Institute for Humanitarian Law. The
Oxford Manual, supra note 88, published in 1913 by the Institute de Droit
International, was an early attempt at comprehensive treatment.
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out against military objectives and not civilian objects,3

observing
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principles of necessity and proportionality. 235 Military commanders are

held to a standard of what they know, or should have known, at the
time an attack order is given.236 Necessity and proportionality
standards during armed conflict may be different from those governing
self-defense. 37 For example, a deliberate attack on a port facility
during armed conflict demands more consideration of what is a proper
military objective than may be possible if a warship in the territorial
sea, internal waters or a port faces imminent or actual missile attack. If
a country is in an armed conflict situation, the same rules apply to its
responses to attacks or displays of hostile intent by States other than its
enemies.
D. THE DUE REGARD PRINCIPLE

The San Remo Manual developed the "due regard" principle,
taken from clauses in the LOS conventions, for situations involving the
have due regard
maritime environment, declaring that belligerents must
2 38
for the maritime environment in combat operations.

234

Protocol 1, supra note 25, arts. 48, 52(2); see also San Remo

38-41; Robertson, The Principle, supra note 28;
Manual, supra note 27,
supra note 28 and accompanying text.
235 Protocol I, supra note 25, arts. 51(5)(b), 57(2)(a)(iii); San Remo
Manual, supra note 27, 46;Thomas & Duncan, supra note 2, 5.2, at 292,
294 nn.6, 7; supra notes 27, 29 and accompanying text.
236 See supra notes 22-35 and accompanying text.
237 Walker, supra note 22, at 352; see also supra notes 3-35 and
accompanying text.
238 San Remo Manual, supra note 27,

12, 34, 36, 88, 106(c) &

cmts.; see also id. 36 ("take care" to avoid damaging cables, pipelines not
exclusively serving belligerents); International Committee of the Red Cross,
Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the
Environment in Times of Armed Conflict (1994), reprinted in Thomas &
Duncan, supra note 2, Annex 8A-1; id. 8.1.3; Walker, supra note 22, ch. 6
(inter alia criticizing San Remo Manual, supra); Horace B. Robertson, Jr., The
"New" Law of the Sea and the Law of Armed Conflict at Sea, in John Norton
Moore & Robert F. Turner, Oceans Law, in READINGS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW
FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW 1978-1994, 68 INT'L L. STUD. SER.
45, 263, 302 & n.I (1995). On the LOS, see generally, e.g., UNCLOS, supra
note 2, art. 87(2) (states exercising LOS high seas freedoms must pay due
regard to others' high seas rights); High Seas Convention, supra note 8, art. 2
("reasonable regard" to other States' interests). Report, supra note 155, at 22028, offers definitions for due regard; the phrase occurs over 20 times in
UNCLOS, supra.
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E. SPECIAL SITUATIONS IN THE LA W OFNA VAL WARFARE AND
NEUTRALITY

As noted above, the rules for excluding merchantmen from,
and asking third state warships to leave, an immediate arena of military
operations might apply in the territorial sea by analogy in LOAC
situations where self-defense is not implicated. States engaged in these
military operations retain the right of individual, unit, national and
collective self-defense and immunity status for ships and military
aircraft.239 Military aircraft and ships may enter territorial waters and
ports in distress situations during armed conflict, although they and
their crews may be subject to internment for the duration
of the conflict
240
if they are belligerents, depending on circumstances.
IV. REPRISALS; RETORSIONS; STATE OF NECESSITY

States may commit reprisals to compel an opposing state to
cease its breach of international law. A reprisal is a proportional breach
of the law; before imposing a reprisal, a state must notify the
wrongdoer of its intended action to give the wrongdoer a chance to end
its unlawful course. 24' Reprisals might be contrasted with retorsions,
239
240

See supra Parts IL.B.I, ll.B.4.
A belligerent's warship or aircraft entering territorial waters of a

co-belligerent (alliance or coalition partner) in distress obviously would not be
interned. There may be other situations where the LOAC does not require
internment. See supra notes 138, 222-29 and accompanying text.
241
Most commentators say use of force as a reprisal during situations
not involving armed conflict violates international law. Project Case, supra
note 158, 1997 I.C.J. at 54; Nicaragua Case, supra note 11, 1986 I.C.J. at 127;
Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 7; Roberto Ago, Addendum to
Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/318 & Add. 1-4,
Y.B. INT'L L. COMm.
13, 69-70 (1981); D.W. Bowett, Self-Defence in
International Law 13 (1958); Brierly, supra note 7, at 401-02; Ian Brownlie,
International Law and the Use of Force by States 281 (1963); COLOMBOS,
supra note 28, § 863; Goodrich et al., supra note 4, at 340-47; 2 Oppenheim,
supra note 74, §§ 43, 52a; Stone, supra note 27, at 286-87; Thomas & Duncan,
supra note 2,
6.2.3, 6.2.3.1; D.W. Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to
Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 20 (1972); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of
Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in Anthony
Cassesse, The Current Legal Regulation of the Use of Force 435, 444 (1986);
but see, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGREssIoN AND SELF-DEFENCE 215-16
(2d ed. 1988) (States can use reprisals involving force during peacetime). For
analysis of wartime reprisals for breach of blockade rules, see COLOMBOS,
supra note 28, §§ 845-62; see also Franck, supra note 20, at 719-42 (noting
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which are unfriendly but proportionate lawful acts 242 that have the same

purpose, compelling law compliance by a wrongdoer. Both might be
invoked in LOAC situations. There are important exceptions to the
right of reprisal, e.g., the Second Convention bar on reprisals against
the wounded, sick and shipwrecked and personnel, ships and equipment
entitled to that Convention's protections; however, that bar that does
not forbid retorsions.243 Sometimes the LOAC may declare that certain
acts cannot be considered retorsions. 24
The state of necessity principle may apply in a given situation.
Recently the U.N. General Assembly approved the International Law
Commission Draft Articles on State Responsibility, whose Article 25

lays down principles for circumstances justifying a breach of
international law to avert a greater harm.245 An example might be a
belligerent's entering a neutral state's territorial sea without notice to
the neutral because of exigent circumstances to effect rescue of
civilians in a sinking boat where the alternative would be loss of human
life. This would be a technical breach of neutrality principles but
should be excusable under the circumstances. 246 State of necessity as
an excuse for breach of law is different from use of the term in selfdefense or LOAC situations, where the word means a limitation on
action, rather than a justification for the action.
V. CONCLUSIONS

This article demonstrates that rules of international law
different from those in the law of the sea applying to ports, port
distinction among proportionality in self-defense, LOAC and reprisal
situations, and three other situations).
242 Brierly, supra note 7, at 399; 2 Hyde, supra note 55, § 588; Frits
Kalshoven, Belligerent Reprisals 27 (1971); 2 Oppenheim, supra note 74, §
135; RESTATEMENT, supra note 5, § 905 & r.n. 8; Stone, supra note 27, at 28889. ILC Draft Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 4, Part 3, ch. 1, 2001
ILC Rep., supra note 4, at 324-54, reprintedin Crawford, supra note 4, at 281302, would chart a new course away from traditional reprisal and retorsion law
and substitute a new term, countermeasures.
243
Second Convention, supra note 10, art. 47; 2 Pictet, supra note
143, at 252-56; see also supra notes 28, 173 and accompanying text.
244
E.g., Hague XIII, supra note 10, art. 26, declaring that a neutral's
exercising rights in id. may not be considered "an unfriendly act." See also
supra note 195 and accompanying text.
245 See supra note 103-04 and accompanying text.
246 Previous hypotheticals, supra Part II.B.5.d, were in the LOS, not
the LOAC, context posited here.
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security and the nearby territorial sea may apply in armed conflict
situations. These range from individual and collective self-defense
under the Charter and customary law, or Charter law-based standards in
binding U.N. resolutions, to law of armed conflict rules, which apply
through the law of the sea conventions' "other rules" clauses. Law of
treaties rules -e.g., pacta sunt servanda, impossibility of performance,
fundamental change of circumstances, and armed conflict justifying
suspending or nullifying treaty-based rules during the conflict - may
apply. However, the law of treaties rules does not apply to rules that
are part of customary international law. Belligerents must give due
regard to standards for environmental protection. Special treaty rules
and standards based on international custom and general principles for
naval warfare and neutrality must be followed, as well as the general
rules of military objective, necessity and proportionality during attacks,
and customary law and general principles related to the LOAC, and
these standards can be different than those applied in self-defense or
Charter law situations. Today jus cogens is an additional factor that
must be considered in the analysis
Sometimes the result can be quite different from law of the sea
standards governing ports, ports security and the surrounding territorial
sea. The Maersk Alabama piracy incident is an example. Although
this case involved high seas issues at the start, the attacked vessel
sought and reached Mombasa, Kenya, its port of destination after
crossing Kenya's territorial sea.247 The law of ports, port security, and
the territorial sea around all ports, will necessarily implicate these
issues in the future.

247

See supra note 53 and accompanying text.

